

2

# bulletin



THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC SITUATION	1017
THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC SITUATION	1034
THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC SITUATION	1051
THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC SITUATION	1067
THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC SITUATION	1074



# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## North Atlantic Council Holds Ministerial Session

### TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE<sup>1</sup>

The North Atlantic Council held its regular December Ministerial Session in Paris on the 15th and 16th of December. Member governments were represented by Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers. Dr. Kristinn Gudmundsson, Foreign Minister of Iceland, acted as chairman.

I. The Council examined and assessed the present international situation.

It unanimously welcomed the vigour with which the three Western Ministers had presented to the second Geneva Conference the proposals already outlined at previous meetings of the North Atlantic Council. These proposals aimed at the reunification of Germany through free elections; left the unified German Government free to choose its own foreign policy and offered a security pact to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Council noted with regret:

1. that the U.S.S.R. had repudiated the proposal to negotiate on the reunification of Germany through free elections, in spite of the directive agreed at the first Geneva conference.

2. that the U. S.S.R. was opposed to any effective system for the control of armaments including the air inspection plan proposed by President Eisenhower.

3. that the U.S.S.R. had given proof of its fear and hostility with regard to the free exchange of information between the people of the Soviet Union and the free world.

The Council declared that the negative outcome of the Geneva Conference had in no way halted the efforts of the North Atlantic powers to secure the reunification of Germany in freedom, such reunification continuing to be held by them as an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

The Council reaffirmed that they consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs; it stressed once again that the security and welfare of Berlin should be considered as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation; it urged the importance of consulting further within NATO on the question of German reunification and on the situation in Berlin.

The Council also reviewed recent provocative moves and declarations by the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East and Asia. They recognised that these tactics, coupled with a continued increase in Soviet military capability, created new problems and a new challenge to the Free World.

II. Following a report by the Secretary General on the work and activities of the Organization in the last eight months, the Council discussed future defence planning of NATO. It considered the Annual Review Report for 1955 and approved force goals for 1956, 1957 and 1958. The Council welcomed the German Federal Republic's participation for the first time in the NATO Annual Review. The Council adopted procedures designed to give new impulse and direction to the future defence planning of the Alliance and to ensure even closer co-operation in this field. The Council expressed the firm determination of all member governments to see the Atlantic forces equipped with the most modern weapons. The Council noted with satisfaction that substantial progress could be achieved in this respect as a result of the valuable assistance of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.

The Council devoted major attention to improving the arrangements for air defence and warning in Europe. It accepted recommendations for the

<sup>1</sup> Issued at Paris on Dec. 16.

re-organization and closer co-ordination of the air defence in NATO European countries, so as to integrate further NATO activities in this vital field. The Council also received a report on a new type of communications system for air defence and warning. The United States offered to finance a pilot project for this new system.

III. The Council recognised that recent developments in the international situation made it more necessary than ever to have closer co-operation between the members of the Alliance as envisaged in Article 2 of the Treaty. They decided to instruct the Permanent Council to examine and implement all measures conducive to this end.

IV. In concluding its work, the Council declared that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the essential foundation of the security of the fifteen associated nations. Such associations are in direct contrast to the obsolete system under which isolated nations are in danger of being subjugated, one by one, by despotic groups such as the Communist bloc.

#### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES<sup>2</sup>

Press release 693 dated December 13

I am leaving to attend the North Atlantic Treaty Council which will be held in Paris the latter part of this week.

This will be the fourth of the North Atlantic Council meetings which I will have attended this year. The first one was in May at the time when the arrangements were completed to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty. Then at the same time we went to Vienna to sign the Austrian State Treaty, which liberated Austria from Soviet occupation.

Then there came the meeting that we had before the summit conference at Geneva, where policies and programs for that conference were discussed with the North Atlantic Treaty Council. And then before the Foreign Ministers meeting which was held last October and November, we had another meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council. And now this meeting comes.

At this meeting we expect to deal not only with the military problems which the North Atlantic

<sup>2</sup> Made on Dec. 13 as he left Washington to attend the NAC meeting (press release 693). The United States was represented at the meeting by Secretary Dulles, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson.

Treaty Organization always has to deal with but to exchange views about the significance of the Soviet action during recent months. I hope we can reach an agreement as to the significance of these moves, these zigzags, that have been taking place.

All of this shows the increasing vitality and strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As I say, it is not merely a military organization, but the members are constantly seeking for and finding ways to express their fellowship and unity by being helpful to each other in other ways than purely military.

Then, of course, these meetings also give a chance for talks on the side as between the Foreign Ministers of countries which have special matters in common. I look forward very much to seeing M. Pinay, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will be seeing Mr. Macmillan, the British Foreign Secretary, and no doubt others. These meetings are very important byproducts of our North Atlantic Treaty Council meetings. I expect to be back next Sunday.

#### U.N. Human Rights Day, 1955

##### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS December 10, 1955, marks the seventh anniversary of the proclaiming of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a common standard of achievement for all nations and all peoples, and will be observed by the members of the United Nations as Human Rights Day; and

WHEREAS December 15, 1955, marks the one hundred and sixty-fourth anniversary of the adoption of our Bill of Rights as the first ten Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and

WHEREAS the great fundamental of our national life is our common belief that every human being is divinely endowed with dignity and worth and with inalienable rights, and that to grow and flourish people must be free; and

WHEREAS one of the great purposes of our Government is to maintain freedom and justice among ourselves and to champion them for others so that we may work effectively for enduring peace;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim December 10, 1955, as United Nations Human Rights Day. I do call upon the people of the United States to celebrate this day by the study and reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations, and the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United States, that we may strengthen

<sup>1</sup> No. 3121; 20 Fed. Reg. 9327.



our determination that every citizen of the United States shall have the opportunity to develop to his fullest capacity in accord with the faith which gave birth to this nation, and may realize more fully our obligation to labor earnestly, patiently, and prayerfully for peace, freedom, and justice throughout the world.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighth day of December in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.



By the President :

JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
Secretary of State

## Meeting With Congressional Leaders

*Statement by James C. Hagerty  
Press Secretary to the President*

White House press release dated December 13

The President met today with the leaders of both political parties in the Senate and the House of Representatives for a bipartisan conference on the problems of foreign affairs and national defense which will be submitted to the 1956 Congress.

Subjects under discussion included foreign affairs, the national defense budget, mutual security appropriations, the program of the United States Information Agency, policies on the question of disarmament, and the Organization for Trade Cooperation.

At the start of the meeting the President thanked the leaders for accepting his invitation to discuss these subjects. He pointed out that he desired to discuss them on a bipartisan basis with the leaders of the legislative branch of the government and to receive their observations and suggestions prior to the opening of the Congress.

The Secretary of State presented a review of world conditions since the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva. He said that his department placed special emphasis on the economic aspects of foreign policy, particularly in view of the stepped-up Soviet campaign in this field in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. He also urged ap-

proval by the Congress of American participation in the Organization for Trade Cooperation.

The Secretary of Defense reviewed with the leaders the program of the defense establishment of the United States and the force levels which must be maintained to protect the Nation against attack and to assure the maintenance of peace in this atomic age.

The Director of the International Cooperation Administration outlined the aspects of mutual security, including mutual military support and economic and technical assistance for our allies and friends.

The President discussed the program of the United States Information Agency. The President and the Deputy Director of the Agency stressed the necessity for expanding the Agency's program to present America's proposals for peace to all the peoples of the world.

The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament Planning discussed in detail proposals for disarmament, particularly those phases dealing with the President's "open sky" recommendation. He pointed to the overwhelming vote taken yesterday at the United Nations<sup>1</sup> as an indication of worldwide support and interest in our country's pursuit of world peace.

A general discussion was held after each subject was presented.

The President asked me to add one further thing directly from him:

"I want to give my thanks and my very real gratitude to the leaders on both sides of the aisle in the Senate and the House of Representatives for the very great contribution they have made and are making to true bipartisanship."

## Continued Detention of U.S. Civilians by Communist China

Press release 699 dated December 16

The Chinese Communists on December 15 issued a statement defending their continued detention

<sup>1</sup> The Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly on Dec. 12 approved by a vote of 53-5 a resolution on disarmament which, *inter alia*, gives priority to early agreement on and early implementation of President Eisenhower's aerial inspection plan.

of U.S. civilians in China. At the same time they accused the United States of not complying with the agreed announcement of September 10<sup>1</sup> regarding the repatriation of civilians to Communist China.

Because the Communist statement contains many errors, this statement is being made. The facts show that the United States has scrupulously complied with its agreement and that Chinese in the United States are now and have at all times since the announcement been free to leave.

Unfortunately the same is not true with respect to the Chinese Communist performance of its agreement to permit U.S. civilians to "expeditiously" return to the United States. Of the 19 U.S. citizens in Communist China who were being prevented from returning on September 10, the date of the Chinese Communist agreement, only 5 have been released.

U.S. Ambassador Johnson has repeatedly protested to Communist Ambassador Wang, in the Geneva talks, the failure of the Communists to permit U.S. citizens to leave China. He has also protested the cruel and inhuman treatment of those concerning whom facts are available.

The answer to these protests has been the public statement by the Communists charging that the United States has not permitted Chinese to leave the United States.

In the agreed announcement of September 10, the Chinese Communist Ambassador declared:

The People's Republic of China recognizes that Americans in the People's Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.

This declaration is simple, clear, and positive. It says that any U.S. citizen has the right to leave China and that the Communists have taken or will take the necessary steps so that those who wish may leave "expeditiously." No distinction is made as between those in prison and those out of prison. All U.S. citizens who wish to leave should have been out of Communist China long before this. The continued holding of these U.S. citizens by the Communists is a violation of their agreed announcement, for which the United States must continue to protest.

As for the Communist charge that the United States is preventing Chinese from leaving the

United States, it is sufficient to point out that not a single Chinese has been refused exit. If anyone knows of any Chinese who wishes to leave and who claims he is being prevented, he should communicate at once with the Department of State or the Indian Embassy at Washington, D.C., which the United States has agreed may render assistance. The Indian Embassy has made no representation that any Chinese is being prevented from leaving.

It is unfortunate that the Chinese Communists have seen fit to make a public announcement containing charges which are without foundation. This cannot conceal the fact that U.S. citizens continue to be held in prison by the Communists in violation of their public announcement of September 10. It is to be hoped that these U.S. citizens will be permitted promptly to leave Communist prisons and return to their homes.

## Discussions Concerning Financing of Egyptian Dam Project

Press release 700 dated December 17

Mr. Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, Egyptian Minister of Finance, met yesterday with Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins and World Bank President Eugene Black for final talks before his departure for Cairo.

During their stay in Washington, Mr. Kaissouni and his colleagues have been carrying on discussions with the management of the World Bank and representatives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments concerning possible assistance in the execution of the High Aswan Dam project.

The United States and British Governments assured the Egyptian Government through Mr. Kaissouni of their support in this project, which would be of inestimable importance in the development of the Egyptian economy and in the improvement of the welfare of the Egyptian people. Such assistance would take the form of grants from the United States and the United Kingdom toward defraying foreign exchange costs of the first stages of the work. This phase, involving the Colfer Dam, foundations for the main dam, and auxiliary work will take from four to five years. Further, assurance has been given to Mr. Kaissouni that the Governments of the United

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

States and the United Kingdom would, subject to legislative authority, be prepared to consider sympathetically in the light of then existing circumstances further support toward financing the later stages to supplement World Bank financing.

Mr. Kaissouni plans to leave Washington for

Egypt today, and it is understood that he will report to his Government on his talks here. Final understandings with the British and American Governments and the World Bank will await Mr. Kaissouni's consultation with the Egyptian Government.

## Women in the Foreign Service

### A TRIBUTE TO AMBASSADOR WILLIS

by *Donald R. Heath*  
*Ambassador to Lebanon*<sup>1</sup>

I take a personal and professional pride in being present at this ceremony. In presenting your Eminent Achievement Award to Frances Willis<sup>2</sup> you are honoring a brilliant woman who truly deserves that award. You are also honoring the Foreign Service of the United States, in which I have served for the past 35 years. I venture to say that the men and women of the Foreign Service Officer Corps, who protect your Nation's interests in 76 countries across the world, will feel as I do. They will approve highly of your judgment, and they will identify themselves with your recognition of her achievement.

I feel that I can speak for the men and women of the Service. More directly I am speaking for Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson, who, as you know, had planned to be with you and Ambassador Willis at this ceremony. He has asked me to read this message.

I deeply regret that the pressure of official duties in Washington prevents my attendance at the Eminent Achievement Award Luncheon sponsored by the American Woman's Association in tribute to my esteemed colleague, the Honorable Frances E. Willis, United States Ambassador to Switzerland.

Bestowing this year's award for high achievement to Ambassador Willis not only constitutes a special recognition of distinct attainment by a woman of extraordinary

capacity and versatility, but it also underlines the importance the American people attach to the work of our representatives who are conducting our foreign relations abroad.

It is the aim of the members of the Foreign Service not only to promote the interests of the United States throughout the world but also faithfully to represent the ideals of the American people. Ambassador Willis' long and brilliant career in the Foreign Service is typical of the service of those dedicated men and women upon whose judgment, perspicacity, and patient efforts much of the security, prestige, and welfare of the Nation depends.

I take this opportunity to extend my most cordial felicitations to Ambassador Willis, our first woman career Ambassador, for the honor the American Woman's Association has bestowed upon her and my best wishes for her continued success and happiness in the Foreign Service.

I am sure that all of us join in that gracious wish for the continued success and happiness of Ambassador Willis.

### Women in Foreign Service

Having been a convinced feminist since my teens—which was a good many decades ago—it is a matter of surprise to me that the progressive United States took until the year of our Lord 1953 to appoint its first career woman ambassador. We should have admitted women into the career Foreign Service quite a few years before we did. At that, I don't know that we are much behind other progressive countries—I will not say in *feminizing* our Foreign Service—I prefer to say in *improving* our Foreign Service by taking women into it.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Woman's Association at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 19.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland.

Ambassador Willis was not the first woman career member of our Foreign Service. She came in in 1927, but 2 years before that another woman had successfully passed the Foreign Service examinations. That was Miss Lucile Atcherson. And back in 1925 I had the pleasure of working with her in Bern, Switzerland—the very capital to which our first career woman ambassador was appointed.

As I said, Ambassador Willis entered the Foreign Service of the United States in 1927—at the foot of the ladder, I may say. Step by step she worked her way up the ladder, assuming increasing responsibilities with each step upward, reaching the top rung in 1953. On July 20 of that year she became our Ambassador to Switzerland.

Her case sounds like proof positive of what we tell our young Class 6 Foreign Service officers. We tell them that opportunity to work their way up to the top is limited only by their own ability; and we point out to them that 6 out of 10 of our ambassadors and ministers today have come up from the ranks.

The number of women career Foreign Service officers is increasing rapidly now, and since the Wriston Committee's recommendations for integration of the Department's Foreign and Departmental services, the participation of women in the career service is accelerating.

Although Ambassador Willis is the first career-service woman in history to become Chief of Mission, we have had five other women in the history of the service who have become Chiefs of Mission; two others, Ambassadors; and three, Ministers. But Ambassador Willis is the only one to have come up from the ranks of the career Foreign Service.

#### Growth of the Foreign Service

The career of Ambassador Willis exemplifies a fundamental growth of the Foreign Service into a truly professional Service. In 1927 the United States had diplomatic representatives in 54 countries. Of these Chiefs of Mission only 8 were career officers. In 1955 we have Chiefs of Mission in 76 countries, and 42 of them are career officers.

The farsighted Rogers Act, approved on May 24, 1924, is the starting point for any consideration of the Foreign Service. It broke down the previously hard-and-fast line between the diplomatic and consular services. It provided that the two

Services be amalgamated and known as the Foreign Service of the United States, and it created the title "Foreign Service officer."

Just as there was a rise in professional competency—and the recognition of that competency—there has been an increase in the size of the Foreign Service officer corps. That increase was not marked, however, until the years following World War II when our Nation accepted the responsibilities of world leadership. In 1924 the Rogers Act amalgamated 512 consular officers and 122 diplomatic officers into a Foreign Service of 634 men and women. In 1940 the total of Foreign Service officers was 826. Today, by the latest figures out of our IBM calculators, there are 2,146 FSO's. Of these present officers, 118 are women—an extraordinary figure, considering the personal sacrifice and dedication their careers represent. And this figure of 118 will, as I have said, increase steadily and rapidly.

A breakdown of the total strength of the Foreign Service might be interesting and help clarify the position of the career FSO:

Chiefs of Mission	Total
(33 political appointees and 42 FSO's) . . . .	75
FSO's (not including Chiefs of Mission) . . . .	2,104
Foreign Service Reserve . . . . .	383
Foreign Service Staff . . . . .	4,236
Consular Agents (in special category) . . . .	20
<hr/>	
Total . . . . .	6,818
Local employees . . . . .	9,725

This growth in size is a direct index of the responsibilities our country has been forced to assume in the conduct of its foreign relations. To preserve our Nation's interests we must have a highly trained, integrated, and fully competent Foreign Service. We are moving to reach that goal.

You have heard of the so-called Wriston Committee, the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel. This committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. Henry Wriston, recommended to the Secretary many fundamental changes.<sup>3</sup> A major recommendation accepted by the Secretary and now in process of enactment is the integration into one Foreign Service officer corps of all the Civil Service and Foreign Service staff positions above a certain level of employment.

<sup>3</sup> See report of the committee entitled *Toward a Stronger Foreign Service*, June 1954, Department of State publication 5458.



Thus within a very few years we will have an officer corps of perhaps 4,000 men and women trained and available for assignments anywhere in the world.

#### Officer Training

Training for these officers is crucial. Heretofore the Foreign Service in all its history has never had sufficient manpower to make it possible for its officers to be spared in any appreciable numbers for study and training. Under the new planning there will be three periods—one at the time of entry into the Service as an FSO-6; a second in midcareer as an FSO-4 or FSO-3, before promotion to Class 2; and a senior training period as an FSO-1 or FSO-2. Each of these periods will consist of 3 months' concentrated training, full time. In addition, a number of officers will receive training in colleges and universities with specialized facilities, usually for a full year's residence. A reorganized and expanded Foreign Service Institute is carrying forward these plans.

When the present operation of integrating Civil Service positions into a Foreign Service officer corps is completed, all recruitment to the Service will be from the bottom, the entry class of FSO-6. With this aim in view the Department has exerted itself to make the youth of the country aware of the opportunities for a career in the Foreign Service. The recruitment was begun in 1954, and as of today 174 young men and women have been sworn into the Service. For 2 years prior to the program there had been no entries whatsoever at this level. In addition, 105 are waiting appointment, and 737 are at some stage of the examining procedure.

These young men and women are coming from every State in the Union. They are entering an historic profession. They will spend most of their lives overseas in the service of their country. You will not often see them in the United States, and relatively few of you will meet them abroad. That, of course, will hold true for all of the Foreign Service officer corps.

This ceremony today is proof that they are not and will not be forgotten, that their service will be recognized by those at home. With that added warmth and belief, I join you in honoring Ambassador Willis, who epitomizes the best and finest in a dedicated Foreign Service.

In conclusion I would like to state a very sin-

cere conviction, a conviction strengthened by a longtime observation of Ambassador Willis and other women in our Foreign Service. My conviction is that, in addition to the undoubted and at least—I repeat, at least—equal intelligence of women, the presence of women in our diplomatic service, our Foreign Service, enriches and strengthens our diplomatic representation. I am not going to expatiate on this conviction although I could do so at length and cite individuals and instances in support of it. But I have talked too long as it is, so I will merely terminate by saying that it is a very good thing, a very good thing indeed, that the American Foreign Service is now a real coeducational institution.

#### Meeting of Public Committee on Personnel

Press release 692 dated December 13

The Secretary of State met on December 12 with the following members of his Public Committee on Personnel: Dr. Henry M. Wriston, chairman, John A. McCone, Morehead Patterson, Charles E. Saltzman, and John H. Whitney. This marks the third reconvened session of the committee for the purpose of auditing the administrative program adopted by the Secretary in May 1954.

Although the final report to the Secretary on the committee's findings at this session will not be made until the session is completed, the committee made several general observations on the status of the program. It expressed its gratification at the considerable progress that has been made on the integration program and on the results of the recruitment activities of the past year. It cautioned, however, against the dangers attendant upon any diminution of the momentum toward integration or any failure to capitalize fully on the accelerated procedures for examining and inducting new Foreign Service officers.

In the latter connection, the committee welcomed the renewed enthusiasm for Foreign Service careers among young men and women throughout the country as evidenced by the tenfold increase in the number of applicants during the past year but cautioned that delay in processing these applicants might dampen this enthusiasm. It felt that the



shortened examination has produced promising results and should result in a system which will reduce the period of time necessary to produce qualified Foreign Service officers.

The committee also strongly recommended a major increase in the use of mechanical means for processing personnel records. It felt that the removal of present deficiencies in this respect would not only introduce substantially greater efficiency in the normal personnel processes of the Department but would also have an important and direct bearing on the speed with which new Foreign Service officers could be brought into the Department.

## Education for Today's World

*by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy<sup>1</sup>*

It is a happy privilege to pay tribute to the men and the institution who have given a century of service to our Nation and our faith.

The Seton Hall of today of course is a far different place from the tiny institution Bishop Bayley, with the support of Bishop McQuaid, the first president, hopefully founded at Madison. Your college of arts and sciences carries on the vital function of undergraduate education, though on a far larger scale. Under the leadership of Archbishop Walsh your schools of education, business administration, nursing, law, and divinity, have come into being to carry even further Bishop Bayley's objective of the development of an educated and cultured laity in this region. Certainly Seton Hall has come far in fulfilling the hopes of its founders. It has served our faith and our church in a manner worthy of Mother Elizabeth Seton, foundress of the Sisters of Charity in America, for whom it was well named.

Since my field of work is foreign affairs, I cannot help but note that in the century since the founding of Seton Hall our Nation and our world have undergone many changes, too. America endured a bloody civil war and its aftereffects. The

<sup>1</sup> Address made at New York, N.Y., at a dinner marking the 100th anniversary of Seton Hall University on Dec. 8 (press release 684).

The committee expressed its "deepest appreciation for the wholehearted cooperation and support" given by the Secretary and congratulated the Secretary on the "substantial and significant administrative achievements" already made under his program.

Finally, the committee praised the "excellent judgment and vigorous leadership" which Deputy Under Secretary Henderson had brought to his task of administering the program and reiterated its admiration and respect for the manner in which the men and women of the Foreign Service officer corps were carrying out their "crucial and delicate" tasks.

world has seen two great conflicts and a number of smaller ones. Modern science has brought changes in ways of living, working, and fighting that are both wonderful and terrible.

When Seton Hall was in its infancy, America, too, was still in the time of its "childhood." Of course, we are still a young nation, but America has changed its role from a minor to a major one in the world. Reluctantly, but with a sense that it was our duty, we carried a tragically heavy load in the two great world conflicts and in the most recent minor one. Now, in the bloodless economic, diplomatic, and spiritual battle to preserve peace, destiny has put us in a position of the most grave responsibility.

The path for Seton Hall was by no means a sure or easy one during the years of its growth, as you well know. There were financial difficulties and disastrous fires. That it has survived and flourished is a tribute to the faith, the hard work, the patient determination and the sacrifice of the Bishops of Newark, the presidents of the university, and the faculty, both lay and clerical.

Nor has the survival of our American Nation from its beginning been by any means easy or sure. But again, faith, hard work, patient determination, and sacrifice by our statesmen, our soldiers, our clergy, and our citizens have brought us to the prosperity and power we know today.

Let us earnestly pray that the next century of growth for our Nation and your university may be as productive and as happy in outcome as the last has been.

### Challenge to Education

Questions of the future of our Nation bring us unavoidably to questions of the future of American education, of which our Catholic universities play so important a part. Does the education provided by Seton Hall University give to our young Americans the equipment, the sinews, the intellectual toughness to deal with the challenges posed to us by today's world? Can our people learn to cope with nations guided by values utterly opposed to everything toward which Bishop Bayley, Archbishop Walsh, and all the others labored and built? Can our system match the high, if brutal, efficiency of the Soviet educational system, which subjects the students from childhood to relentless drive, to hard, unsentimental competition under the dominant, impersonal influence of the Communist state?

Having worked for many years with young people who have been trained at such institutions as Seton Hall, it is my own observation and belief that the ideas and morality, the training and knowledge, the acquaintance with a deeper spiritual tradition which you impart *do* provide your graduates with the culture and perspective, with the technical tools, with the moral discipline they need to deal with the challenge and the problems of today's world.

Yet we must never deceive ourselves that the battle will be easy, that our Nation's present material advantages or our past successes will alone protect us from the threat to our values and our survival. We live in a world of struggle. Constant struggle is the keynote of the Soviet orbit. Its more than three-quarters of a billion people are endlessly driven forward to higher production, more technical learning, more relentless and skillful opposition to our Western World—a world they describe to their youth as the decadent culture, the corrupt social order of capitalism.

That education in our Catholic schools is today meeting the needs of our young people—and the young people of other faiths—is in no way a guaranty that it will do so tomorrow. Only the most constant efforts to improve, to broaden, to strengthen and increase the effectiveness and soundness of the education we give can meet

changing and expanding needs. The truths we teach are ancient; the faith we hold is eternal. But the world to which they must apply is a different world each time the sun rises. Our young people must each day meet the world as it is, not the world as it was nor as we might wish it to be.

As you are aware, the Communist nations encourage the most rigorous examination and self-criticism of the execution of industrial, agricultural, and educational programs. This without doubt is in part responsible for the brutal efficiency with which they too often operate.

If such universities as Seton Hall are to continue to meet the challenge of our times, their faculties and boards of directors must be, as I think they are, toughminded, relentless, and tireless in evaluating, in criticizing, in perfecting the job they do.

We must never forget, of course, the one great weapon, the priceless advantage we have that our opponents do not. I refer to our faith, the reason for being of such institutions as Seton Hall.

### Power of Faith

The story of our religion is the story of the power of faith in one true God over the false deities of materialism and worldly might. It is the story of the endurance of institutions built on respect for the supreme importance of the human soul, the dignity of the individual, over those built on the spiritually bankrupt worship of the all-powerful state.

We must ever be reminded that it would be unpardonably blind to ignore our faith in the name of curriculum and efficiency.

But at the same time we must not forget that it would be hypocrisy or self-deception to ignore efficiency and curriculum in the name of faith.

More could be said about the need for continuing self-evaluation and improvement of the way we teach. But those of you whose life is teaching are much more aware than I of our needs and the means of meeting them. So in the time I have left I want to draw on my own field of work and discuss with you recent events in today's world—this challenging, dangerous, and often unpredictable world that our teachers must teach about and our people must learn to live in.

The most recent event of major political importance was the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva. As you know, that meeting grew out of the summit conference between the Heads of

State last summer. Our Secretary of State went to this second Geneva meeting in a further effort to make some progress, however slight, toward solutions of the difficult problems which for 10 years have threatened the peace. Mr. Dulles was fully aware not only of the complexity of these problems but of the conflicts of interests involved. As the Secretary of State said of our delegation in his initial statement, it was "dedicated to exploring patiently and sincerely all possible approaches to realistic solutions of these problems."

In his report to the Nation following his return from Geneva,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Dulles told why agreements were not reached. "The Soviet Union," he said, "appears to want certain results in terms of European security, disarmament, and contacts of a sort. But it is not yet willing to pay the price needed to get these results. And when I say pay the price, I do not refer to bargaining terms. I mean the price in terms of doing what is inherently necessary to reach the results which we all say we want."

#### Discussions at Geneva

The Ministers discussed first the question of European security and Germany. The Soviet Union at the summit conference had explicitly promised to consider the reunification of Germany by free elections and had explicitly recognized the close link between the reunification of Germany and European security. But when the Soviets came to face up to what reunification involved, they balked, as they have always balked since Potsdam. Obviously, if Germany were reunified by free elections this would mean the end of the puppet regime in East Germany. This in turn would almost surely have had serious repercussions upon the other satellite countries of Eastern Europe, where the Soviet-controlled governments are facing rising pressure. So Mr. Molotov for the first time publicly took the position that, while the U.S.S.R. is eager to achieve a treaty of European security, it would not sacrifice the East German regime to do so. In other words, Mr. Molotov brazenly abandoned the principle of free elections in East Germany to which the U.S.S.R. has given lip service since it agreed to them in 1945.

The second problem discussed was the limitation of armaments. Both sides indicated an eager de-

sire to bring about limitation. But the Western nations naturally are unwilling to agree to disarm unless they can be sure that both sides are carrying out whatever agreement is made. That is why they insist that disarmament be effectively supervised.

But the Soviet Government was, at Geneva, unable to allow inspection and control which, if adequate, would open up a society still largely based on secretiveness. So these seeds of a stronger peace fell also upon barren ground. The discussion of disarmament was inconclusive.

The third item on the agenda was the development of contacts between East and West. The Western powers put forward 17 proposals, many of them involving the freer exchange of ideas, information and news.<sup>3</sup> All such proposals were rejected by the Soviet delegation. After a generation of the most rigid thought control, the Soviet rulers could not bring themselves to permit wider contacts with the free nations.

At the empty end of the second Geneva conference many people wondered whether those hopeful words "the spirit of Geneva" had lost their meaning.

When he returned to this country, the President told the people that the acid test of the summit conference would begin when the Foreign Ministers met. That testing has so far shown that the Soviet leaders to some extent would retain the appearance of cooperative relations with the West, but they have not yet shown that they are willing to create the necessary conditions for secure peace.

During the course of their tours in India and Burma, the Soviet emissaries, Premier Bulganin and Party Secretary Khrushchev, lost no opportunity to flatter Asians at the expense of the West, to promote discord between East and West, to indulge in invective against the Western powers. Our Secretary of State well describes this conduct as at least qualifying the elements of survival of the spirit of Geneva, observing that so far in any event the element of threat is absent.<sup>4</sup>

Thus we have seen the Stalinist period of crass military aggression succeeded by an exuberant splurge of ideological revival meetings under the personal direction of Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev, who keynote the inevitability of the

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 778.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1007.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 807.

world reaching Lenin's goal of a classless society but amiably suggest that the socialist state in the Soviet Union is prepared, no doubt as a matter of grace, to live at peace with the capitalist world. We are witnessing a renaissance of the Communist method of penetration and proselytizing which takes the line that countries which are decadent enough or backward enough still to cling to democratic methods involving two or multiparty systems rather than the single-party system of the Soviet Union are to be pitied. The present campaign involves all the classical distortion of facts in an effort to mislead and tempt, by one form of offer or another, the peoples of the uncommitted areas or those involved in regional or local controversies or difficulties. It involves an effort to

undermine the Western collective security system, to reduce the free world's defense contributions by casting doubt on the need for such effort in the light of Soviet charm, and a direct campaign against the maintenance by the United States of foreign bases.

The outcome of the second Geneva conference makes clear to us again the grim realities of the world we live in today. It shows us the stern demands that meeting these realities makes upon our strength, spiritual, physical, and mental. An awareness of these realities and these demands can give you at Seton Hall and at our other great Catholic schools across the land a guide in providing an education whose greatness can meet the challenges that face us all today.

## A Review of the World Economic Situation

by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Dealing with the world economic situation is a little like trying to follow the design of a kaleidoscope. The bits and pieces remain constant but the pattern is always changing, depending on the viewpoint from which the kaleidoscope is regarded. With this in mind, I thought it might be helpful to say something first about the basic pieces that go to make up the economic patterns and then describe one or two of the patterns.

### Western Europe

Let us begin with Western Europe. This is an area characterized by high industrial skills, a dynamic economic philosophy, and a political climate conducive to high-level production. This area has experienced a spectacular economic upswing since the fall of 1952, and signs are now appearing which suggest that the slack in industrial capacity and manpower may be largely taken up.

A highly significant facet of the postwar re-

covery of Western Europe is revealed by a close look at the prime sources of support of continued expansion in different periods. Right after the war, expansion was chiefly promoted by the reconstruction expenditures of governments. After Korea, government spending—this time in the form of defense spending—was again the impelling force raising the level of economic activity. A slackening occurred from mid-1951 to late 1952. Then expansion resumed and its moving force was the private expenditure of European investors and consumers. It is heartening to see this solid evidence of Europe's economic strength and of European citizens' confidence in Europe's destiny.

From mid-1952 to mid-1955, the Western European countries in the OEEC, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, raised the total volume of their exports by more than 20 percent, their industrial production about 15 percent, and their gold and dollar reserves over 25 percent. Except in the United Kingdom, hard currency reserves in Western Europe are at comfortable levels, in fact, at record highs. For the

<sup>1</sup>Address made at the Agricultural Outlook Conference at Washington, D. C., on Nov. 28.



first time in the postwar period the rapid economic expansion was accompanied by relative stability in wages and prices and by conservative monetary and fiscal policies. Many of the countries have undertaken extensive measures to free international trade and payments and to remove internal economic controls. Furthermore, this boom was marked by substantial increases in capital investment and housing, and a rise in the production of durable consumer goods involving heavy installment credit finance.

During the last year, however, storm warnings have gone up signaling a danger that Western Europe may be straining the limits of its present capacity. The rate of expansion has been slowing down, and inflationary pressures seem to be increasing.

The high levels of economic activity caused a sharp rise in imports, largely those from the dollar area. The general trade deficit of the combined OEEC countries increased by 50 percent in the first 5 months of 1955, and the rise in the dollar trade deficit in the first quarter of 1955 was even greater. The rate of increase in gold and dollar reserves has slowed down, reflecting a deterioration of the position of the U.K. and the sterling area.

Industrial production has held up but has begun to level off. By the first quarter of this year, the curve of industrial output for Norway, Denmark, and Sweden flattened out altogether and the curves for the U.K. and France look as though they may be starting to flatten also.

Wages and prices have recently risen sharply in several countries, notably the U.K., and a threat of similar increase exists in Germany.

The storm warnings are not going unheeded by European governments.

The British Government raised its bank rate to 4½ percent, invoked restrictions on installment credit, trimmed the investment programs of the nationalized industries and of the central government, and requested local authorities to take similar action.

The Federal Republic of Germany is concerned lest higher prices for imported scarce products, especially coal, and higher wages will push up prices and deteriorate Germany's competitive position. However, Germany's strong external position makes it possible to keep the price level under pressure through increased imports. Monetary and fiscal policy are likely to remain strongly conservative. And inflationary pressures among

Germany's competitors are more immediate and stronger. In addition, the slow start on the German rearmament program may very well reduce the overall demand on the economy below originally anticipated levels. Thus, the German anxieties may be exaggerated.

### The Far East

Another piece in our kaleidoscope is the Far East. Like Europe, this area was drastically affected by World War II. Moreover, the free world and the Communist countries of the area have suffered from the economic impact of later military conflicts. If pressed for a one-sentence summary of the economic situation of the free nations of this area, I would say that the past record has not been too bright but that the economic picture is on the whole more encouraging today.

All the nations of the Far East have very low standards of living from our viewpoint. Most are new countries which have emerged from colonial status since the war. With the notable exception of Japan, they have on the whole been suppliers of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods. However, many of them now feel that they must attain a greater degree of industrial self-sufficiency as an essential factor in their national independence.

Virtually all of the countries of the Far East suffered severe damage during World War II, and in every case economic patterns of long standing were disrupted. Nearly all of the free countries suffered also from Communist disruptive tactics ranging from planned rioting and strikes to armed uprising, civil war, and invasion.

Let us consider the area in five parts—Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, Communist China, and then Southeast Asia.

*Japan.* Japan is a nation in which the pressure of population on arable land is one of the highest in the world. Japan must trade to be able to maintain even a standard of living which is low in comparison with the West. And in the postwar period Japan's customary economic problems have been intensified by loss of markets in China and a low level of trade with Korea and Southeast Asia.

Japan's importance to the United States and to the free world led us to seek to promote Japan's reemergence as a major trading nation. All our hopes for cooperation from Japan's free-world



partners have not yet been realized, but there were encouraging developments in 1955.

The improvement in Japan's foreign trade and exchange position was dramatic. Exports continued their upward trend and are likely to reach an annual level of nearly \$1.9 billion, compared to \$1.6 billion in 1954 and \$1.3 billion in 1953. No similar rapid increase in imports developed. Industrial production in the first three quarters of 1955 was 6 percent above the same period a year ago. The rice harvest is expected to be one of the largest in Japan's history.

Nonetheless, Japan still faces grave problems. The increase in foreign exchange occurred because the trade deficit was exceeded by foreign exchange receipts from other sources, notably from U.S. military procurement and troop expenditure. Other weak spots are evident. Small business is squeezed by high cost of imported raw materials and by shortages of capital and high interest rates. Because of rising international prices of freight and raw materials, Japanese businessmen have recently again considered the possibility of increasing coal and possibly also iron ore imports from Communist China.

On balance, Japan's economy in 1955 registered a continued though moderate expansion. The inflationary pressures which had threatened internal economic stability and the foreign trade position in 1953-54 have been successfully contained by deflationary measures of the Government without depressing economic growth.

The \$64 question in Japan is whether the current rate of expansion is sufficient over the longer run to absorb the rapidly expanding labor force. In the shorter run, Japan will remain very sensitive to the fluctuations of international business conditions.

*Korea.* Let us look briefly at Korea. The division of this country at the 38th parallel left the South with an overcrowded peninsula, a chaotic fiscal situation, and a substantial but ill-balanced and rundown plant which Koreans could not effectively operate. Progress had been attained by the spring of 1950, when the Communists struck and Korea became a battlefield. With the help of the U.S. and the U.N., Korea has reached a stage at which both industrial and agricultural production exceed the 1949 level. However, with the handicap of the burden of supporting a large military force, it is doubtful that Korea can soon attain the goal of self-support.

*The Republic of China.* Since 1949, the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan—sometimes called Formosa—has had to cope with two abnormal economic burdens: (1) the influx of some two million refugees from the mainland—roughly an immediate population jump of one-quarter; and (2) the necessity to maintain a disproportionately large armed force in face of the Communist threat.

In spite of these abnormal burdens, the Government of the Republic of China can point to heartening production increases in industry and agriculture. A factor contributing to increased agricultural production has been the successful implementation of the land reform program.

Taiwan has made good use of U.S. economic aid. Prices have become increasingly stable. Taiwan's standard of living is considered to be the highest in the Far East, except for Japan.

*Communist China.* As for Communist China, its Government has embarked on an ambitious program calling for the development of heavy industries and socialization in which the consumer receives no priority.

The economy of Communist China continued to expand during the past year, but at only about one-half of the 10 percent rate of increase achieved from 1950 through 1954. In looking at these figures, it is well to remember that they reflect increases over a very low base. Industrial output is to rise only 5 percent under the 1955 plan, compared to the reported rise of 17 percent during 1954. Agricultural output appears to have recovered from the sharp setback it received in 1954 when the rice crop was below the previous year's level and cotton production was considerably reduced by the widespread floods. Prices remain stable largely because of the Government-controlled distribution system.

The Government in 1955 continued to invest largely in heavy industry and transport and communications and budgeted an increase in military expenditures of 20 percent over that of 1954.

Despite the Communist efforts, the increase in food production per capita on Taiwan has been far greater than on the mainland.

*Southeast Asia.* The kaleidoscope contains some highly important bits and pieces often grouped together as the countries of Southeast Asia. These countries may be generally classified as underdeveloped countries. They have very limited industrial developments, and low per

capita income, and are largely dependent upon the demand for, and price of, their three basic commodities—rice, tin, and rubber.

With the exception of Burma, the economic picture in these countries has improved considerably during the past year. In Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines the budgetary situation, the balance of payments, and foreign exchange reserves have all been strengthened. The surplus commodity problem, which appeared extremely serious at the beginning of the year, was, for the most part, overcome when Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Burma largely disposed of their surplus rice. The world market for rubber and tin continues strong, and the rapidly increasing price for rubber which has developed has served to bolster the economies of those countries that produce it.

Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia still suffer from the dislocations resulting from 7 years of strife, and much of the rice lands are still out of production. In these countries it now appears desirable to shift our aid programs from measures designed to meet emergency wartime situations to longer-range programs which will help restore the productivity of its land and encourage the industry of its people.

A summary view of recent economic developments in South and Southeast Asia must clearly make allowances for the exceptionally favorable conditions due to good crop yields. The governments are determined to speed economic growth, but they have many problems before them. The absence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class and the association of foreign private capital with colonialism, along with the oppressive poverty which makes domestic savings and investment very difficult, are tremendous obstacles to economic growth in the underdeveloped countries of the world.

#### **India**

A particularly interesting fragment in the kaleidoscope is India. Large in terms of population, area, and production, India has been experiencing a substantial and a rising rate of economic growth. Attributable in part to exceptional weather bringing good crops, these increases were accompanied by drops in prices despite increased Government expenditures and a record pace of investment expenditure making up for the slow progress of earlier years. But it has yet to be de-

termined whether, in the absence of fortuitous factors, a rate of investment can be sustained at levels required for steady growth in per capita income. This is a key element of the appraisal of the prospects for the success of the Indian 5-year plan. Another is the climate for investment which India is prepared to create.

#### **The Near and Middle East**

The vast area comprising the Near East, South Asia, and Africa is large geographically. It does not loom so large in the economic kaleidoscope today. However, this area is in a state of economic and political transition. As a whole, it is usually regarded as an underdeveloped area. The population is unevenly distributed, and there has been relatively little systematic development of the natural resources with which many countries in the area are richly endowed. Moreover, by and large, this area of the world stands in vivid contrast with the nations in which education, industrial training, economic philosophy, and political outlook are all consistent with high-level and expanding production and rising living standards. Except for Greece and Turkey, there is little evidence that the rate of growth in the Near and Middle East is on a level which can achieve steady increases in per capita income. In Greece, and especially Turkey, the process of development has brought with it internal inflation and external balance-of-payments problems. But these may well be economic growing pains.

Agricultural production in the Near East in 1955 seems to be larger than in the previous year with particularly good crops in Greece and Turkey. The Turkish crop failure of 1954, as a result of a serious drought, was one of the major factors contributing to the rapid inflation and the substantial foreign trade deficit of that year and the even greater one in the first half of 1955, which resulted in a 26 percent drop in foreign exchange reserves from mid-54 to mid-55.

Industrial production has continued to expand at a fairly rapid rate in the more developed countries of the area, including Greece, Lebanon, and Israel. Industrial production in Greece was more than 10 percent above 1954 in the first half of 1955. Production in Turkey continued its steady rise even though hampered by shortages of imported raw materials.

There has been a steady upward trend in petroleum production in the Near East which continued

into the first half of 1955, reaching a new high point. Well over half of the exports of the Near Eastern countries consists of petroleum. In 1954 the four major petroleum exporters of the area, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, increased their exports and with them, despite an increase in imports, their already substantial foreign trade surplus.

The other countries of the area continued to run a large foreign trade deficit even though imports were restricted below their peak 1951 level and total exports were slowly rising, approaching the 1951 peak. Egypt's position shifted from a modest surplus in the first half of 1954 to a moderate foreign trade deficit in the first half of 1955, largely as the result of a sharp drop in exports. This reflected lower cotton prices and difficulties in marketing the crop. Barter agreements with Soviet-bloc countries were made in an attempt to alleviate the serious foreign trade problem of the country.

#### **The European Soviet Bloc**

Another piece in the global economic kaleidoscope is the European Soviet bloc.

Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. showed continued increases in total production in 1954 and 1955 although this growth in the satellites was not as smooth as in the U.S.S.R. In the satellites the rate of industrial growth slackened in 1954, and agricultural production was subnormal. 1955 brought considerable recovery in both regards.

Agricultural and industrial output in the bloc both rose in 1955. As regards agriculture, the increase was attributable to the combined impact of good weather, expanded acreage, and greater use of fertilizer and machinery. Industrial production in the European Soviet bloc in the first 6 months of 1955 was generally 10 percent higher than in the first half of 1954.

Some attempt was made to ease domestic economic problems by an expansion in imports from the non-Communist world financed through an increase in exports and partly through gold shipments. Both the expansion of trade and the shipment of gold started during the latter half of 1953 and has continued to date. A substantial part of the increase in imports in 1954 from the non-Communist world consisted of foods. There was no significant change in imports of capital goods or of industrial raw materials. But with the total

imports of the European Soviet bloc from the non-Communist world amounting to only \$1.5 billion per year, the impact of even large changes in this on the total economy of the bloc must necessarily be quite limited.

Indications point to continued rapid economic expansion in the bloc, since a high rate of investment continues to be maintained.

#### **Latin America**

Now let us look at some of the Western Hemisphere pieces in our economic kaleidoscope. First of all, Latin America. The economic outlook for Latin America over any short-run period simply is the outlook for a relatively small number of export products. Most of these countries are still dependent in large measure on their export trade. A number still possess primarily one-commodity economies.

Chile, for example, depends principally on copper for the foreign exchange with which she buys her imports. At the moment copper prices are relatively high and prospects are good, at least for the near future. In spite of the favorable prices now obtaining, however, Chile has a balance-of-payments problem and has had to maintain controls on imports as a result of internal inflation which has plagued the country for a number of years.

Bolivia has a similar problem. Tin prices are far below wartime peaks. Production has declined in recent years, and the Government is experiencing great difficulty in providing adequate foreign exchange for even essential imports. Bolivia is one of the few countries in Latin America which has received grant aid from the United States in the form of surplus agricultural commodities, although a number of others have arranged to purchase cotton and foodstuffs for local currencies, under the provisions of title I of Public Law 480.

Venezuela derives 70 percent of its foreign exchange from exports of petroleum and related products. The petroleum industry has had a rapid expansion throughout the past decade, and the Venezuelan market is, and should continue to be, one of the best in Latin America for both agricultural and industrial exports from the U.S.

Sugar is the principal export of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic and is also important in the trade of Peru, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Sugar has been in surplus supply for several years.

During the past year prices have been relatively stable at, or slightly below, the lower limit provided under the International Sugar Agreement. Consideration is now being given to renewal of the agreement, and it is hoped that, when renegotiated, it will cover an increased share of the world trade in sugar and provide a greater measure of price stability.

Latin America's most important export, both from the standpoint of total value and as to number of countries affected, is coffee. It is exported by 14 countries and is the most important export of 5 of these countries. In 1954 coffee accounted for 61 percent of the total value of Brazil's exports, for 84 percent of Colombia's, for 88 percent of El Salvador's, 78 percent of Guatemala's, and 79 percent of Haiti's. Considering the 20 American Republics as a whole, coffee exports represented 36 percent of the total value of their exports in 1954.

Coffee prices are currently at approximately the 1953 level, and if they remain near this level the producing countries will have little cause for concern. However, coffee future prices are currently well below the spot-market level, reflecting an anticipated decline in price as production increases over the next few years, with large new plantings coming into bearing; and the producing countries are greatly concerned that this may mark the beginning of a long-term downward price trend. They recall the ruinously low prices which prevailed throughout the 1930's and 1940's and are endeavoring to agree upon measures for joint action to stabilize prices. The outlook for American exports in this area depends to a considerable degree on whether or not these measures are successful.

Something might perhaps be said about the political outlook in certain areas where trade has been affected by political developments. With the new regime in Argentina there is reason to expect an increase in agricultural production, which was formerly the backbone of the Argentine economy. The new Minister of Commerce has announced that, to remunerate producers and promote expansion of areas under cultivation, prices of 1955-56 agricultural crops will be raised across the board. The new Minister of Trade has stated that Argentina's future trade policy would be aimed at freeing overseas trade, returning the trade to private enterprise, and encouraging an expansion of exports. These policies, if carried out success-

fully, will bolster Argentina's internal economy, encourage new capital investment, and lead to a sound expansion that will benefit both Argentina and the countries which trade with her.

Guatemala is recovering rapidly from the revolution against the Communist regime which disrupted her economy last year. This recovery should be furthered by the decision of the U.S. to help complete the Inter-American Highway within 3 years if possible. When completed, this through route from the Mexican border to Panama should lead to a considerable expansion of tourist traffic and, later, to the development of an increasing trade with the Central American countries which it traverses.

Haiti, which suffered serious hurricane damage last year, has also made a rapid recovery.

Brazil, by its very size, is a factor of importance in any appraisal of the outlook for Latin America. Coffee is its principal export, and there, as I have said, the long-run outlook is somewhat doubtful. However, Brazil's coffee exports during the past 2 months have been very high in relation to those of earlier months of this year. The newly elected government will come to power in January with a somewhat less pressing fiscal problem than might have been predicted a few months ago, and the outlook for containing inflation, and possibly relaxing import controls, is brighter than in some time.

#### Other Countries

Time does not permit even a brief mention of all countries in the world. I am especially conscious of having omitted most of the British Commonwealth countries. Of these, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Union of South Africa are rapidly developing countries of the British Commonwealth facing the problem of maintaining growth without inflation.

#### The United States

Before we finish with the bits and pieces of the world economic situation, a word about the U.S. is in order. The phenomenal economic growth of our country is staggering to foreign observers, as it often seems to many of us at home. The extent to which all levels have shared this prosperity is perhaps less widely realized abroad than here. However, many of our friends abroad who follow developments here are keenly conscious of the



grave problem of the discrepancy in the economic position of agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of our economy. And they are understandably interested in the course of action we plan to take to resolve this dilemma.

In foreign eyes, the U.S. is often awfully viewed as the economic giant which, through its unprecedented vast market and economic strength, affords opportunities for economic growth but which, by the same token, can plunge the world into economic disaster. Two heartening developments to them were the fact that U.S. economic growth has indeed been spectacular and that the slackening of activity here which ended a year ago was short-lived and did not herald a downturn of the economic activity of the free world.

#### Recapitulations

We have looked at the pieces in our kaleidoscope. Let us now look at two patterns formed by those pieces: first, for the immediate future; and second, the long-range outlook.

*Immediate Outlook.* In examining the immediate outlook it should be noted that in 1955 the more highly industrialized countries of the free world continued to maintain their rate of unprecedented economic expansion, and Western Europe increased its gross production over 5 percent. Western Europe is on the verge of pressing to the limit its plant capacity and available manpower. Inflationary pressures are evident in some countries. Orthodox measures are being adopted to combat inflation in response to these signs of economic and financial strain. With the major exception of the U. K., the international economic position of this part of the free world, both in terms of current transactions and size of financial reserves, is quite good.

In contrast only a few of the less industrialized, or so-called underdeveloped, countries of the free world have been able to expand their production at half the rate of Western Europe. Economic progress in most of the underdeveloped countries has barely kept pace with population growth. The immediate prospects of these countries are bound up with a worldwide fall in all agricultural prices—with the major exception of rubber—and with the appearance of surpluses of most major crops. The most troublesome surpluses are those of wheat, rice, and cotton.

Although some of the underdeveloped countries

have experienced fairly good overall rates of growth during the postwar period as a whole, this has been partly due to factors which may not recur. For example, in Latin America, per-capita-wise output has been constant since 1951 and investment particularly has fallen below the 1951 and 1952 levels. In South and Southeast Asia the postwar growth was in part the result of the especially good crops of 1952-53 and 1953-54. These factors may have resulted in a higher rate of economic expansion than can be sustained over the longer run. Even in the case of India, with its ambitious program for expansion, there is concern that a sufficient volume of capital formation is not being attained to sustain a steady increase in per capita income.

This somewhat somber picture does not presage an immediate and rapid economic growth throughout the free world. Nor does it suggest that the problems associated with agricultural surpluses are soon to evaporate.

*Long-Range Outlook.* Now let's discuss the long-range outlook, which, incidentally, has a brighter aspect. On a long-term basis the record of economic growth is distinctly favorable in the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, and Latin America. Western European capacity to save is proving sufficient, not alone for its own investment needs, but is also furnishing a source of capital for underdeveloped countries.

In the underdeveloped countries profits make possible comparatively favorable rates of return on direct investments. Whether these rates will, in fact, be favorable enough to attract adequate capital for sustained economic growth depends on a variety of factors, including political developments in these countries.

It is noteworthy that, although on an overall basis in Southeastern Asia and Latin America, economic growth has barely kept pace with the growth of population, this is not true of all countries and per capita economic progress has been significant in several. There is also evidence that Southeast Asia may be moving off dead center after a period of stagnation.

Perhaps the most reassuring indication is the fact that thus far the dislocations and economic downturns have shown no tendency to snowball. Evidence of a latent basic economic strength in the free world, hitherto not fully appreciated, appeared during this period. For example:



Western Europe maintained its rate of investment when U.S. aid slackened off.

Western Europe is also turning out to be a good market for Latin America.

The U.S. economy has proved stable and has demonstrated a striking capacity to adjust itself without capsizing, as some foreign observers feared it might.

Some years ago, apprehensions were epitomized in the phrase: "When the U.S. sneezes, Europe gets pneumonia." These forebodings saw no realization in 1954. In fact, sustained European purchases in the U.S. during this period actually helped our recovery from what turned out to be only a mild cold.

Thus the prospects for continued economic growth in the free world give us good grounds for encouragement—but not for complacency.

## Cotton Textile Imports From Japan

*Following is an exchange of correspondence between Secretary Dulles and Senator Margaret Chase Smith.*

### Secretary Dulles to Senator Smith

DECEMBER 1, 1955

DEAR SENATOR SMITH: I have read with much interest your letter of November 21, 1955 on the cotton textile situation. The problem you describe has been of concern to the Department and I have discussed the matter personally with leaders of the American textile industry.

I do not believe that there is any real difference between the Administration's foreign trade program and the position that you state in your letter. You will recall that on February 17, 1955 the President wrote to Representative Joseph A. Martin in support of the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act.<sup>1</sup> In this letter, the President said that no American industry will be placed in jeopardy by the administration of the Act. This Department and the eight other departments and agencies of the Government that participate in the Trade Agreements Committee follow this policy. Furthermore, I have personally advised representatives of the Japanese Government that

they should exercise restraint in their exports and not attempt to capture so much of the American market that an American industry will be injured.

The Japanese Government and textile industry are aware of the attitude of the domestic textile industry toward increased imports of cotton textiles. They appear to be genuinely engaged in an attempt to allay the fears of our domestic producers by devising controls on exports of textiles and finished goods to the U.S. Reports from Tokyo indicate that apparently both quality standards and quantitative controls will be instituted. We are informed that until these controls have been worked out the Japanese Government will refuse to accept any further applications for the export of cotton textiles and finished goods to this country.

The legislation under which the trade agreements program operates has a number of safeguards for American industry. The Tariff Commission determines in advance of trade agreement negotiations the limit to which concessions may be made in the existing tariff structure without causing or threatening serious injury to a domestic industry. These so-called "peril points" were not breached in the 1955 concessions granted to Japan.

The domestic textile industry has complained that despite the fact that the "peril points" were not breached, the industry is being injured or threatened by imports of Japanese textiles. A further safeguard exists in the so-called "escape clause" of the Trade Agreements Act. Under this provision the domestic textile industry could request the Tariff Commission to conduct an investigation to determine whether, as a result of the concessions granted to Japan or to other countries, textile imports have increased to such a degree as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry. It may be that certain sectors of the domestic textile industry may require relief from imports. If such is the case this provision offers the industry the avenue through which to get relief. Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 121 of the last session of Congress, the Tariff Commission was directed to keep itself currently informed on the effect of textile imports on the domestic industry so that it may act promptly on an escape clause action.

The Department has explained these procedures to the textile industry. The industry appears reluctant, however, to apply for relief under the escape clause. Considering that the "peril points"

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN OF MAR. 7, 1955, p. 388.

were not breached in the concessions granted to Japan, that the reduced tariff rates have been in effect only ten weeks, and that the industry has been reluctant to request an escape clause investigation, this Department has no basis on which to concur in the industry's claims that it is being injured or threatened by Japanese textile imports. Our difficulty is enhanced by the fact that although textile imports have increased over 1954 levels, cotton cloth imports during the first eight months of this year were at an annual rate of only slightly more than 1 percent of our domestic cotton cloth production and less than one-fifth of the level of our own cotton cloth exports. Furthermore, there is every indication from press reports that the domestic textile industry in general is operating at a high level of activity, with the output of many mills sold ahead as far as the spring of 1956.

You refer in your letter to Congress taking appropriate action at its next session presumably to curb imports of Japanese cotton textiles. The Department is aware of legislation (S. 2702) sponsored by more than sixty Senators at the last session to accomplish this purpose. I consider legislation to establish import quotas on Japanese textiles would be most unfortunate.

Such action would strike a serious blow at the Administration's foreign trade program which the President has worked so hard to establish over the last three years. It would serve to restrict trade at a time when the free world must depend for so much of its strength on the expansion of trade and the economic viability of countries such as Japan. Only economically strong countries can share with the United States the mutual defense burden of the free world.

The United States does not have in effect today a single import quota on manufactured products. We are continually using this fact in negotiations with other governments in our efforts to get them to liberalize their own trade restrictions to admit more American goods into their countries. Significant progress has been made in this direction. But the opportunity for further progress would be seriously diminished by Congressional action establishing import quotas on textiles. In fact, such restrictive action on our part might prompt other governments similarly to increase restrictions on imports from Japan.

Such action would be unfortunate as well in view of Japan's efforts to establish a policy of restraint on her textile exports to the United

States, particularly in view of the reluctance of the American textile industry to request an escape clause investigation that would determine the nature of the injury caused or threatened to the domestic textile industry.

Finally, I believe such action would be unfortunate because of its effects on the ability of this country to sell goods to Japan. We want Japan to be able to buy our surpluses of cotton, wheat, and rice, and our coal and petroleum because these goods are essential to Japan's economic stability and her national security and because American producers of these goods look upon Japan as a good market. It should be noted that Japan is the largest importer of American raw cotton, taking 653,000 bales during the 1954-1955 cotton season, or nearly 20% of our total raw cotton exports. Japan cannot be expected to maintain a high level of imports from the U.S. if we restrict her exports to us to a low level. In 1954, Japan exported \$276 million worth of goods to the U.S. and imported \$677 million, leaving a net import deficit of \$400 million. This gap was filled by the expenditures of our military forces in Japan, but such expenditures are declining as a result of the redeployment of our forces in the Far East and diminishing offshore procurement. Instead of restricting her exports to the United States, Japan is faced with the problem of increasing her dollar earnings to bridge its dollar gap or eventually her imports from the United States will decline.

I know that the many and complex factors bearing on the problem which I have attempted to outline will be considered carefully by you and your colleagues in the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

The Honorable

MARGARET CHASE SMITH,  
*United States Senate.*

Senator Smith to Secretary Dulles

NOVEMBER 21, 1955

Honorable JOHN FOSTER DULLES,

*Secretary of State,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It was almost a year ago on December 14, 1954 when I protested to you against the threat of a lowering of the tariff schedule on textile products. At that time, I

pointed out that the largest single New England manufacturing industry is textiles, providing a payroll of one hundred seventy-eight thousand persons.

Ultimately protective measures were agreed upon by Congress and the State Department and the threat was lessened. Perhaps the action of the Japanese in restricting exports while the Reciprocal Trade Bill was being debated in Congress gave the impression that the threat was not as grave as it seemed at the time. But if that were the case, then all such illusions were dispelled when after the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Bill Japanese exports soared.

As I stated to you a year ago, the objective of maximum trade between nations of the world is worthy. I have consistently supported the Reciprocal Trade Agreements legislation. But, as I pointed out, we must not let our desires in that regard blind us to the inequities, both to textile workers and textile manufacturers of New England, that would result from any reduction of tariffs on textile products which would allow nations with lower wage and living standards than ours to invade the American market and cause unemployment and a loss to our regional economy.

I want to emphasize again that it is one thing to help other nations of the world raise their living standards, but it is another thing to permit cheap foreign labor to undermine our own textile industry and thus take jobs away from textile workers and destroy the hard earned investments of textile managements and investors with unemployment and the shutting down of textile plants.

The Administration has a solemn duty to protect American workers and management from the cut rate competition created by the lower wages and lower living standards of competing foreign nations.

I am not unmindful of the complexity of this problem—of the desire to help Japan become so strong economically that the danger of the Communists taking over that country would be removed. In fact, earlier this year I conferred in Tokyo with the then acting Foreign Minister of Japan on this subject. I assured him that our country wanted to be helpful on this point—but I warned him not to the point of literally exporting textile jobs and industry out of Maine to build up such industry in Japan, especially when Japanese labor received wages of only one-tenth or less of that which American labor received.

Our country has been more than generous to Japan, giving her the money to build an entirely new and modern textile industry of seven billion spindles. The tariffs were then lowered making it possible for thirteen and a half cent-an-hour Japanese labor to flood our markets with textile merchandise.

The element of reciprocity seems to be absent as Japan expresses its appreciation for the help we have thus given her by now buying their cotton in Brazil and Mexico.

These results lead me to the inescapable conclusion that in this Japanese textile matter our country must make a reappraisal of its policy however agonizing that reappraisal may necessarily be, because of these facts:

(1) The present policy is leading to the destruction of the New England textile industry;

(2) It is forcing American labor to compete with cheap thirteen and a half cent-an-hour Japanese labor;

(3) And at that rate, it is not helping Japan raise her living standards—but rather would only serve to lower our own with the ultimate choice being that of either forcing our American economy back to a thirteen and a half cent-an-hour standard or writing the textile industry off as expendable;

(4) There is nothing reciprocal in this policy with Japan purchasing her cotton from other nations;

(5) We must be mindful that our country has given Japan the money to build an entirely new and modern textile industry—when our own New England textile industry could well have used such United States financial assistance to modernize its mills;

(6) While the threat of a nation going Communist because of economic weakness is serious, we must not let that be used as a perpetuated economic blackmail; and

(7) While we want to help our foreign friends, even our once bitter enemies like Japan and Germany, let us use reason that invites respect from the recipient instead of blind, unlimited generosity that ultimately breeds contempt.

The time is overdue when we must stop the cutting of tariffs and the increasing of quotas on Japanese textile imports. I am sure that many of my colleagues in the Congress share these views and that in the next session of Congress appropriate action will be sought.

In closing, let me say that while I expect to continue the past support that I have given to Reciprocal Trade, I will not do so in such extreme as to join those who seem to feel that the New England textile industry is expendable. To the contrary, I intend to fight not only for the survival of the New England textile industry but for

its full recovery and maximum expansion in which I have the greatest confidence if its own Government will permit.

I would appreciate hearing from you on this matter at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

MARGARET CHASE SMITH

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Admission of New Members to the United Nations

#### STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U. S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U. N.<sup>1</sup>

In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly on September 22d, Secretary of State Dulles pointed out that "our organization's power derives largely from moral judgments formed here" and that, therefore, it is essential that "there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of the charter."

He pointed out that about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here and many of them meet the membership tests of our charter. "They are peace-loving, and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the charter's obligations. Their governments could reflect here important segments of world opinion. To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is not only a grave wrong to them; it is also a wrong to this organization and to all of its members. I hope that, during this Tenth Session, action will be taken by the Security Council and by this Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus, the United Nations would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind."

A large number of deserving and qualified nations have been blocked from admission to the

United Nations because of the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto power in the Security Council. Among these nations, in the European area, are Italy, Austria, Finland, Eire, and Portugal. The Security Council has not as yet taken up the application of Spain, which is also a deserving and qualified nation. In the Near and Far East, the number of deserving and qualified nations includes seven countries specifically endorsed for immediate United Nations membership by the Bandung conference of last spring: Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal.

It has been reported that the Soviet Union would be willing to withhold its veto and accept these free nations as members of the United Nations if the free world is willing to accept the admission of nations behind the so-called Iron Curtain—nations whose governments are not equals among equals as are nations of the free world, but are in a subordinate relationship to Moscow.

To refrain from preventing the entrance of satellites into the United Nations does not mean approval of their present systems of government, nor does it condone the violations of human rights in which these governments have persistently engaged. Indeed, there is reason to hope that membership in the United Nations will to some extent bring the peoples of these countries closer to independence.

The overriding fact is that the admission of 13 free nations greatly outweighs whatever drawbacks there may be in the admission of the others

<sup>1</sup> U.S. delegation press release 2271 dated Nov. 13.



because the 13 nations would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the United Nations.

For these reasons, the United States intends to vote for the admission of the 13 and to abstain on the others. Our abstention in the Security Council on the applications of satellites is consistent with our national policy, as expressed in the Vandenberg resolution of 1948 (80th Congress), which called for voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to remove the veto from the admission of new members. This proposal covers 17 new members, 13 of whom we favor. The satellites would include Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, since it is obvious that Outer Mongolia cannot make the grade.

#### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE, DECEMBER 7<sup>1</sup>

On this question of the admission of new members, the United States is guided by three basic principles:

1. To bring into membership all qualified states which apply;
2. To follow the provisions of the charter as to judging the qualifications of the applicants;
3. To avoid thwarting the will of a qualified majority by use in the Security Council of the veto, a voting privilege given to five nations in the expectation that it would only be used in exceptional circumstances. The United States recalls that the Vandenberg resolution, overwhelmingly adopted by the United States Senate in June 1948, expressed the view that there should be agreement never to use the veto to prevent the admission of new members.

Consistent with the foregoing principles, we shall continue to seek the admission of all qualified states which have applied. They would be members already if the great majority had its way. Only the Soviet veto, or threat of veto, bars them.

The recent statement of the Soviet delegate which was carried in an Associated Press dispatch of November 17 that the Soviet Union would "categorically refuse to consider any proposal" other than one for 18 applicants is an example of a rigid, inflexible attitude which, if adopted by all nations, would make it impossible for the United

Nations to function. International relations require some spirit of accommodation and compromise—and this is especially true of the membership problem.

There are six European applicants clearly qualified for membership, namely, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. There are the seven Asian-African applicants whose membership was recommended by the Bandung conference for present admission, namely, Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal. These also are equally clearly qualified.

All of these 13 we support. We believe that there are other qualified applicants. For example, we do not believe that the Republic of Korea should be barred from membership merely because part of its territory is wrongfully and forcefully detached from the authority of what this General Assembly has held to be the only lawfully elected government in Korea. The Republic of Viet-Nam is another qualified applicant, barred only by Soviet veto.

We shall not support in any form the applications made for Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, and Rumania. In our opinion, the governments of these states are not now independent and their present subject status constitutes, or derives from, a violation of treaties and other international engagements.

The United States recognizes, however, that the issues before us are those about which there can be honest differences of opinion. For this reason, among others, it is not our intention to use the veto in the Security Council to thwart what may be the will of a qualified majority in the Security Council and in the General Assembly in relation to the subject matter of the joint resolution. Should this bring before the Security Council resolutions on admission which, in our opinion, involve infractions of the charter, we shall, in accordance with the spirit of the Vandenberg resolution, abstain from voting so as not to exercise, on this question of admissions, the veto power.

We shall abstain from voting on the joint resolution now before us [U.N. doc. A/AC. 80/L. 3/Rev. 1] because, while in form this resolution only requests the Security Council to "consider" certain applications, some practical interpretations of that resolution are such that we hesitate to vote for it lest that might seem to involve us in a departure from our principles enumerated above.

<sup>1</sup> Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (U.S. delegation press release 2312 dated Dec. 8).



We earnestly hope that out of the present discussion will come the admission of those qualified states whose exclusion clearly violates our charter and whose presence amongst us will add greatly to the wisdom of our councils and to the weight of moral authority which is exercised by this organization.

#### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE, DECEMBER 13<sup>1</sup>

What I am about to say is said as the representative of a government which profoundly believes in the desirability of admitting new members to the United Nations. With that in mind and with the very great respect that I have for you, sir, [Sir Leslie Munro, President of the Council] I must say that I do not share your belief as to the fact that there is a definite purpose in this resolution,<sup>4</sup> or a definite obligation here, to give effect to whatever the General Assembly may have voted. We certainly have the obligation to give it tremendous weight and give it very respectful consideration. But, certainly, we cannot contend that the Assembly has a right to bind the Security Council any more than the Security Council has a right to bind the Assembly. They are autonomous organs. To my mind, the resolution introduced by New Zealand and Brazil has as its primary purpose to provide an orderly method of voting, an orderly procedure for considering these questions. And it is with that understanding that we look at it.

Now, the representative of China [Dr. T. F. Tsiang], who is making what I think is both a highly intelligent as well as a gallant fight for principles he believes in, is, I think, well within his rights in moving this amendment. In view of the overwhelming sentiment in this Council in the past in favor of the Republic of Korea and in favor of the Republic of Viet-Nam, his motion is, I think, entirely appropriate.

The members of the Council will recall that in April 1949 we voted 9 to 2 in favor of the Republic of Korea, and in September we voted a vote of 10

<sup>1</sup>Made in the Security Council (U. S. delegation press release 2323).

<sup>4</sup>U. N. doc. S/3506, submitted by China as an amendment to the Brazil-New Zealand resolution (S/3502). The draft amendment called for the addition of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam to the list of 18.

#### General Assembly Resolution on New Members<sup>1</sup>

##### *The General Assembly*

Having noted the general sentiment which has been expressed on numerous occasions in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations,

Having received the preliminary report (A/2973) of the Committee of Good Offices established by the General Assembly resolution 718 (VIII) of 23 October 1953,

Taking into account the statements about the admission of new members made by permanent members of the Security Council in the general debate of the present session of the General Assembly,

Believing that a broader representation in the membership of the United Nations will enable the organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation,

1. *Expresses appreciation* of the work and efforts of the Committee of Good Offices;

2. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations, the pending applications for membership of all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises;

3. *Requests further* that the Security Council make its report on these applications to the General Assembly during the present session.

<sup>1</sup>U.N. doc. A/AC. 80/L. 3/Rev. 1; adopted in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Dec. 7 and in the General Assembly (A/Res./357) on Dec. 8 by the same vote: 52 to 2 (China, Cuba), with 5 abstentions (Belgium, France, Greece, Israel, U.S.). South Africa was absent.

to 1 for the Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States has always supported these countries in accordance with this overwhelming sentiment, and we continue to feel that countries who are divided only because of the aggressive action taken against them by others should not be barred from membership by virtue of that illegal division.

In addition to the view that I have expressed about Viet-Nam, I would like to say that the Republic of Korea must always have a special place here in the United Nations. The Republic of Korea not only is important in and of itself, but it was a great symbol of the effort of the free world to take collective action to repel an aggression—something which was deliberately and duly voted by the United Nations and which marked the first time in human history that an aggression was

repelled by collective military action under the auspices of an international organization.

Now, in that contest, in that struggle, which involved more than the Republic of Korea, that small country contributed 52 percent of all the men in the division forward zone, which is where the fighting and the dying took place. I do not think that any member of this body goes outside of the proprieties in offering an amendment similar to that offered by the Republic of China.<sup>5</sup>

## SECOND STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE, DECEMBER 13<sup>1</sup>

The remarks of the Soviet representative [Arkady A. Sobolev] are as inaccurate as they are uncalled for, and that is saying quite a good deal.

When he says that we should ponder well as to who wants and who does not want a solution of the membership question, I echo him. That's the only respect in which I do, because a candid pondering of this situation and a careful examination of the facts can leave no fairminded person in doubt as to where the responsibility lies.

He said that the attitude of the Soviet Union was well known. Indeed, yes, it was very well known. There are lots of things that are well known, and we know them but we don't like them. The salient feature of the attitude of the Soviet Union was an attitude of take it or leave it—"either we have every single thing that we want or else we don't play."

It was perfectly clear that we today could have had 17 nations admitted to the United Nations if it had not been for the Soviet Union. We could have had Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Japan, Laos, and Spain. That is what we could have

<sup>1</sup>In the voting which followed, the amendment submitted by China was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. Thereafter the 18 applicants listed in the joint resolution were voted upon separately, and following the Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia, the U.S.S.R. vetoed all the applicants except the Eastern European satellites. Thus 4 applicants (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania) survived the results of the individual country votes, but when the paragraph as a whole was put to the vote, it failed of adoption by a vote of 1 (U.S.S.R.)-4 (Brazil, China, Peru, Turkey)-6 (Belgium, France, Iran, New Zealand, U.K., U.S.).

<sup>5</sup>Made in the Security Council after the vote on the membership question (U.S. delegation press release 2324).

had, Mr. Chairman. But the Soviet representative insisted on having all or nothing.

As I have said in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, if there is never to be any spirit of compromise, any spirit of accommodation, any give and take, you cannot operate the United Nations. If everybody

## Security Council Draft Resolution on New Members<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

Noting resolution A/Res./357 adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 1955 in which the Security Council was requested "to consider in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations the pending applications for membership of all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises,"

Having considered separately the applications for membership of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Japan, Laos and Spain,

Recommends to the General Assembly the admission of the above-named countries.

<sup>1</sup>U.N. doc. S/3502 dated Dec. 10, co-sponsored by Brazil and New Zealand. The resolution failed of adoption on Dec. 13 by a vote of 1-4-6. For details of the voting, see footnote 5 below.

comes in here with absolutely rigid positions, and we just have this as nothing but a place for a series of head-on collisions, why there is no point in having the United Nations. Of course, you would like to have everything your own way. I would like to have everything my own way. But we have discovered that we can't do it. The essence of tolerance and the essence of the democratic system is that we have some regard for the views of others.

Then the Soviet representative spoke about the representative of the Republic of China and said that Dr. Tsiang only represents himself. Well, many of us in this room can remember the governments in exile during World War II from Norway, from Belgium, from Holland, from Poland, from many other countries. And the statement that Dr. Tsiang only represents himself is only true if the governments in exile during World War II only represented themselves.

Then the Soviet representative trotted out the stale old smear that the United States was the

devil behind this whole thing. He talked about the preparatory campaign of the United States. I am sure every man in this room knows the United States made no campaign. You cannot find a sign of it anywhere. When there are 52 votes in the General Assembly on a position different from that of the United States, that is not a sign that the United States made much of a campaign.

When you look at the Vandenberg resolution which passed the Senate in 1948, in which members of both parties in the United States went on record in favor of never using the veto on membership questions, and you look at the way the United States representative has never used the veto on membership questions, you can see very well that the United States has never sought to influence this situation but has contented itself simply with stating our position—that we favored the 13 free nations and we would abstain on the satellite nations.

When you see that there have been 9 votes here all afternoon, Mr. Chairman, for the satellites—vote in and vote out there were 9 votes for the satellites—that shows perfectly clearly that no effort was made by me or anybody else to organize votes against the satellites. I do think it would be only fair of the Soviet representative to recognize that fact.

The truth of the matter is that, in the type of thinking which the Soviet representative reflects, the idea of equals, people being equals among equals, of small nations and big nations being equals, of their respecting each other's sovereignty—all those concepts are concepts which he simply cannot believe. It is all an idea of the strong and the weak, and the master and the servant. And those are ideas, of course, which are directly contrary to everything that we believe in this country. Because we have been a small country for most of our national existence, we are a country of little people who came here from all over the world to escape oppression, and we look at the world through the eyes of a small country. The idea of our going in for any arm twisting—to use the journalistic phrase—or to seek to put any pressure, or to seek to dictate, or to seek to deliver, is something which the United States can never do.

No, Mr. Chairman, the truth of the matter is that the responsibility is squarely on the Soviet Union. Just count it up for yourselves. Out of 16 vetoes which were cast this afternoon, the So-

viet Union cast 15. Now, that is not rhetoric; that is not oratory; that is not something that I have just invented. That is right in the stenographic transcript of the proceedings, and it will be there for all time to come.

No, Mr. Representative of the Soviet Union, you cannot escape the record. You cannot escape the verdict of history. The truth is mighty and it will prevail.

#### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE, DECEMBER 14<sup>7</sup>

The United States has long favored the admission of all qualified applicants for membership. We are overjoyed that 12 free nations have been elected.<sup>8</sup> They will bring us much in civilization and in wisdom.

We of the United States have worked hard in collaboration with many others, to whom we express our thanks tonight, to help bring this about. The result speaks well for the spirit of give and take without which this organization cannot work.

As I have made clear by actions in the Security Council today, we keenly regret that Japan was not elected. But we will continue to work for her admission.

We cordially welcome all these new members and believe that their presence here will greatly add to the usefulness of the United Nations.

#### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DECEMBER 15<sup>9</sup>

The United States is greatly pleased that despite continued Soviet obstruction over the past 9 years, including the casting of 44 vetoes on admis-

<sup>7</sup> Made in the plenary session of the General Assembly (U.S. delegation press release 2327).

<sup>8</sup> On Dec. 14, at an urgent meeting requested by the U.S.S.R., the Security Council adopted a Soviet proposal recommending to the Assembly admission of 16 applicants—those included in the previous joint resolution, minus Outer Mongolia and Japan. The vote was 8 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Belgium, China, U.S.). A U.S. amendment to add Japan was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. Following the adoption of the resolution calling for the admission of the 16, Ambassador Lodge introduced a resolution according to which the Security Council would recommend to the General Assembly that it admit Japan at its 11th session. The General Assembly met on the evening of Dec. 14 and approved the admission of the 16 applicants recommended by the Council.

<sup>9</sup> Made to correspondents by Lincoln White, Acting Chief of the News Division, Department of State.

sion of new members, 12 free nations have at long last taken their rightful place in the United Nations.

These countries have a great contribution to make to this world body and should increase considerably the vitality and usefulness of the organization.

One glaring injustice remains. As Ambassador [John M.] Allison informed the Japanese Foreign Minister early today, we are extremely sorry that the Soviet Union has once again seen fit to veto Japan's admission to the United Nations. Japan's just claim to membership, which the United States has consistently and actively supported, has again been frustrated by the Soviet Union. The cynical action of the Soviet Union was in defiance of the recognition by the overwhelming majority of the present members of the United Nations that Japan is fully eligible for membership under the charter. It is clear that the Soviet Union in vetoing Japan has sought only to preserve for itself a bargaining pawn. We think the opinion of the world will know how to appraise this self-serving tactic.

Ambassador Lodge made every effort yesterday to bring about the seating of Japan, and the United States will continue to urge upon the United Nations the admission of Japan, which, like the other free nations already admitted, has a considerable contribution to make to the effectiveness of the organization. Indeed, it is not too late to hope that the Soviet Union will yield to the tremendous pressure of world opinion and withdraw its veto of Japan. There is still time to do this if the Soviet Union will but recognize the injustice of Japan's exclusion.

#### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE, DECEMBER 15<sup>10</sup>

It is somewhat hard to understand the argument that the Soviet representative made when he said that the resolution of the United States, which recommends Japan's admission, is not aimed at solving the problem of new members.<sup>11</sup> Those words are quoted from what he said. Surely, Japan would be a new member if she were elected. As Japan is the one great undivided country that is not a member, it seems to me that what we are doing here is directly aimed at solving the problem of new members.

The Soviet representative refers to the General Assembly resolution which has been interpreted as stipulating 18 members, although the figure 18 never occurs anywhere in its text. Surely, it would have been within the reach of the Soviet representative in the *Ad Hoc* Committee to have proposed an amendment stipulating 18 if he really wanted to specify that figure.<sup>12</sup>

In any case, the United States record is perfectly clear. We never supported the figure of 18. I made it clear for the United States Government on November 13 that we thought that 17 was a proper figure.

But even if we had, Mr. President, it must be fundamental that, just as the Security Council cannot bind the General Assembly, so is it true that the General Assembly does not bind the Security Council. As a matter of fact, the resolution in the General Assembly did not seek to bind the Security Council. The resolution in the General Assembly asked the Council to "consider." That verb "consider" was in the resolution. Well,

<sup>10</sup> Made in the Security Council (U.S. delegation press release 2329).

<sup>11</sup> On Dec. 15 the U.S.S.R. vetoed the U.S. resolution recommending admission of Japan at the 11th session of the General Assembly. At the same meeting a Soviet resolution recommending admission of Outer Mongolia and Japan at the 11th session was rejected by a vote of 1 (U.S.S.R.) - 0, with 10 abstentions. The U.K. then proposed that the Security Council take note that Japan is fully qualified for membership and express the hope it will soon be admitted. On Dec. 21, following rejection of a Soviet amendment adding Outer Mongolia to the British resolution, the Council decided to suspend further consideration of the proposal.

<sup>12</sup> In a further intervention Mr. Lodge said: "Mr. President, I unwittingly made a misstatement of fact, which my staff called to my attention, when I said that the General Assembly resolution did not mention the figure 18. The original draft did not but it was amended so that it had the figure 18 in it. Of course, that does not in the least bit vitiate my argument. It still is true that the resolution merely asked the Security Council to consider. It did not seek to bind us. It did not seek to direct us. Obviously, the General Assembly is autonomous, and the Security Council is autonomous. When the Security Council gives due weight to, and considers the views of, the General Assembly, it is doing all it is supposed to do. Certainly, no one could contend that the General Assembly establishes the agenda for the Security Council. I might also add, as I said before, that the United States in any case did not support 18 and that therefore the position that we are taking here is thoroughly consistent. I regret the misstatement and I wanted to correct it so that everything I said would be completely correct."



we have considered it. We have thoroughly kept faith and given due weight to the General Assembly resolution.

Then, Mr. President, the Soviet representative puts Japan and Outer Mongolia in the same bracket. We in the United States just cannot admit that. I do not have in mind so much the fact of Japan's population, importance in size, and contribution to the economic life of the world—although those things in themselves are very impressive. In the city of Boston, Massachusetts, from where I come, is a museum which we think contains the finest exhibit of Japanese art that exists in the world outside of Japan. And anyone who sees that exhibit, which I have from boyhood, and anyone who studies Japanese culture and Japanese philosophy, Japanese contribution to civilization, must be shocked at the notion that Japan and Outer Mongolia should be put in the same bracket.

Of course, there have been tragic periods in our history with Japan. But we are here looking forward, not looking back. We are here working for the peace of the world. Certainly, no one can speak with greater authority on a matter of that kind than did Sir Winston Churchill when he condemned those who harp forever on past wars and refuse to look ahead with optimism and faith to peace. And it is in that spirit that I believe we should recommend the admission of Japan.

Now, Mr. President, I regret to have to do this, but the truth is that the Soviet representative in spite of two reminders by me did not give you here in the Council the full text of what he said. I call your attention to page 3 of the verbatim record of the 705th meeting yesterday. In the next to the last paragraph on page 3, which the Soviet representative read, it said that "Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic would be referred to the next session." Then he went on to say, and I am quoting from the bottom of page 3

and over to the top of page 4, "Such a proposal with regard to Japan in no way alters our positive attitude to the admission of Japan to the United Nations, as may be seen from the Soviet draft resolution submitted earlier to the Security Council. This proposal merely means that the question of the admission of Japan is being postponed until the next session for reasons which are clear to everyone." That's the end of that quotation. As a matter of fact, the reasons are not clear to me and he never saw fit to state them. But this statement deals with Japan. The whole paragraph deals with nothing but Japan. There is no reference to Outer Mongolia at all.

Then on pages 9 and 10 of the verbatim record of the 705th session comes this statement from the Soviet representative: "Our vote against the amendment does not mean that we have changed our attitude on the admission of Japan to the United Nations." Not a word here about Outer Mongolia. "As before, we support the admission of Japan to the United Nations, and the action to be taken by the Security Council at the present time will merely mean that the admission of Japan is postponed until the next session of the General Assembly."

It was on the strength of that statement that I thereupon introduced this resolution, hoping that it would at once be accepted by the Soviet representative and that there could be a demonstration of international harmony and good feeling here which certainly would be most welcome.

Now, that is the actual background for the action which the United States representative has taken. I will not delay the Council any longer, Mr. President. I assume of course that the vote will be taken on my resolution first, which was the first introduced. I have moved it to a vote, and I hope the vote will be taken as soon as other members have completed whatever statements they wish to make.

## The Korean Question

*Statements by Jacob Blaustein  
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

### QUESTION OF KOREAN REPRESENTATION<sup>1</sup>

It has been the practice in this committee to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in the committee's deliberations on this item.<sup>2</sup> We have accorded this privilege to the Republic of Korea in keeping with the general feeling that the victim of the aggression, which called forth the collective action of the United Nations in Korea, should be heard in this debate. In our opinion it is just and proper that a duly appointed representative of the Republic of Korea—which represents the vast majority of the Korean people—should be given the opportunity to state their views before this body.

The United States believes that a representative of the Republic of Korea should again be invited to participate in the deliberations on this item which so vitally affects the future of that Republic. I therefore move that a representative of the Republic of Korea be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of this item.

At this point I should like to state very briefly the grounds on which the United States will oppose the proposal of the distinguished representative of Syria [Ahmed Shukairy] to invite representatives of the North Korean authorities along with the representatives of the Republic of Korea to take part in this debate.

The United States believes it would be unthinkable to extend an invitation to representatives of the authorities which committed the aggression in

Korea. The North Korean regime was found guilty of that aggression by the General Assembly and has no right to participate in our debates. We are not now engaged in a political conference where, obviously, both sides would be represented if there is to be an agreement. We sit here as a committee of the General Assembly, about to consider certain United Nations aspects of the Korean problem.

The United States, therefore, sees no need for the representation here of the Communist authorities of North Korea. They have no right to be heard here, particularly since they have never accepted the competence of the United Nations on the Korean problem and have done nothing to purge themselves of the aggression.

The United States delegation will accordingly vote against the proposal of the representative of Syria.

Moreover, in order to clarify the issue on which we are about to vote, I wish now to make a prior motion. Mr. Chairman, I move that the United States proposal to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea be put to the vote before the proposal of the distinguished representative of Syria is voted upon. I make this motion under Rule 132, which reads as follows: "If two or more proposals relate to the same question, a committee shall, *unless it decides otherwise*, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. . . ."

Under this rule, as you know, this committee is free to decide that the United States proposal to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea shall be voted on first.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On Nov. 11 the committee adopted (44-5-9) the U.S. proposal to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea. The Syrian proposal was rejected (14-34-10).

<sup>2</sup> Statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 10 (U.S. delegation press release 2268).

<sup>3</sup> The agenda item entitled "The Korean Question" was divided into three sub-items: (a) Report of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, (b) Reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, and (c) Problem of Ex-Prisoners of the Korean War. The last two items were proposed by India.

## U. S. POSITION<sup>4</sup>

As we direct our attention once more to the Korean question, we may find some satisfaction in the fact that the cease-fire continues to be observed and that the aggression has not been renewed. Unfortunately, however, there is little ground for satisfaction beyond that, particularly since no significant progress has been made toward solving the problem of Korea's reunification.

At times the problem of a Korean political settlement may appear in these conference rooms to involve little more than a repetition of old arguments, a reaffirmation of old objectives. How easy it seems to be on the part of some to forget that we are discussing the fate of the Korean people, a people whose country remains divided against itself because of the intransigence of the powers who are now in military and political control in the north. The will of the Korean people—as demonstrated by the overwhelming majority which found it possible to express itself freely in honest elections under United Nations observation and later fought so bravely to defend the Republic they had created—their will is for the whole country to be united under a free and independent government dedicated to a genuinely democratic way of life. This is their just goal. And this is also the objective of the General Assembly as expressed in various resolutions since 1947.

Their goal and our objective remain thwarted by the rulers of North Korea, who continue unwilling to surrender their control over North Korea to freely elected representatives of all the Korean people. What is needed to solve the Korean problem is an honest election. What is needed is resort to the democratic process as it is practiced by all free peoples. The United States is convinced that there can be no solution to the Korean problem until the people of Korea are enabled to exercise fully and freely this elementary and indispensable right. They are now being denied this right by a regime which fears freedom, and, in this situation, the United States believes that United Nations supervision is necessary to safeguard this right.

Fifteen nations which responded to the appeal of the United Nations and participated in the military action in Korea to repel the Communist aggression reported last year to the General As-

sembly on the results of the postarmistice conference held at Geneva in the spring of 1954.<sup>5</sup> At that conference and during the Assembly debate last fall it was evident that the Communist side was more anxious to challenge the competence of the United Nations to deal with Korea than it was to seek agreement on acceptable terms for unification.

## Sixteen-Nation Declaration

Faced with this attempt to undermine the authority of the United Nations, the 15 participating nations, in concert with the Republic of Korea, issued a declaration based on two fundamental principles which they believed would provide the basis for a Korean settlement consistent with the objectives of the United Nations. These principles, which were noted with approval in Resolution 811 (IX) of December 11, 1954, read as follows:

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.
2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision, for representatives in the national assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

During the past year, the Communists, regretably, have given no indication whatsoever that they are now ready to accept these two cardinal principles and to move toward a solution of the Korean problem on these terms. Instead, they have proposed further conferences, ranging from limited meetings between groups in North and South Korea to deal with such local problems as trade and travel, to a large-scale international conference on outstanding Asian problems, including Korea. Not one such proposal, however—and they have been made with increasing frequency since summer—contains the slightest intimation that the Communists are at last ready to participate in genuinely free elections under United Nations supervision, an essential first step in a Korean settlement.

In these circumstances, no one should expect the Republic of Korea, or those United Nations members which came to its assistance with military contributions, or the General Assembly, to believe that these Communist proposals for more confer-

<sup>4</sup> Statement made in Committee I on Nov. 11 (U.S. delegation press release 2269 dated Nov. 10).

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. A/2786.

ences reflect a sincere desire to achieve an equitable solution of the Korean problem. Certainly, in the absence of some clear-cut indication of Communist willingness to proceed on terms which the United Nations has already made plain are essential to a Korean settlement, such Communist proposals cannot be given serious consideration. The past record indicates that the Communists intend by such proposals to produce disagreement and dissension in the hope of undermining the monumental achievement of the United Nations in its successful collective security action in Korea. I submit that, in the absence of any sign of a sincere willingness to reach an acceptable settlement, Communist propaganda must not be permitted to shake the unity of purpose that has marked the actions of the United Nations in respect to Korea, thereby jeopardizing the fate of the Korean people.

When proposals for a new conference are advanced, we have a right to ask: In what respect has the Communist position changed? What is the new element in the Communist position which could promote agreement on an acceptable settlement where none was possible before?

#### **Armistice Agreement and Security Measures**

Although it was not intended that the Korean Armistice Agreement would remain in force indefinitely, it still remains and, failing any satisfactory arrangement for the peaceful unification of Korea, probably must remain the formal basis for arrangements with the Communists concerning Korea. The Communists have violated the agreement in many respects, the most important and ominous of which is their repeated and continuing violations of paragraphs 13 (c) and (d) of the armistice agreement. These provisions regulate the introduction of combat personnel and matériel into Korea.

These paragraphs provide in part as follows:

The Commanders of the opposing sides shall . . .

(c) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. . . .

(d) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed,

damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. . . .

These paragraphs further provide that such personnel and matériel may be "introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43" of the agreement. It is also provided that, in order to justify the requirement for introducing matériel into Korea, "reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the MAC [Military Armistice Commission] and the NNSC [Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission]. . . ." And it is specified that "the NNSC, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection" of the replacement of such matériel at the approved ports of entry.

Well, the Communist side has neglected to submit more than an insignificant fraction of the reports required under the armistice; it has obstructed inspection by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in North Korea; and it has introduced illegally a modern air force of 400 to 500 planes, over 300 of which are recent jet types. The United Nations Command has protested these and other violations<sup>6</sup> and for its part has continued to abide scrupulously by all the provisions of the armistice agreement.

In spite of the significant Communist buildup in air force and in important types of ground equipment, including tanks and heavy artillery in North Korea, the Communists claim to have withdrawn a considerable number of Chinese Communist troops. They claim to have withdrawn some 486,000 men, an overall reduction of about 30 percent in the overall Communist troop strength in North Korea and about a 55 percent decrease in the Chinese Communist personnel strength there. The inadequacy of their reports to the Supervisory Commission and their obstruction of the inspection teams make it impossible to verify the accuracy of these claims and, indeed, has rendered the commission ineffective.

The United Nations Command for its part has withdrawn a much larger proportion of foreign military personnel from Korea. These withdrawals were fully reported to, and checked by, the NNSC. The non-Korean strength of the United Nations Command in Korea has been reduced to the point where it now constitutes only

<sup>6</sup> For a recent protest by the U.N. Command, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 191.



about 20 percent of what it was when the armistice went into effect. In contrast, the Chinese Communist strength still constitutes about 45 percent of its strength at the time the armistice went into effect. This sharp decrease in United Nations troop contributions has been compensated to some extent by a strengthening of the Republic of Korea armed forces, which comprised about 540,000 men when the armistice was signed and which now comprises about 650,000 men in 20 army divisions. The expansion of the Republic of Korea armed forces, as you realize, has been completely consistent with the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement. It should be noted, too, that the equipment furnished to the Republic of Korea was provided from stocks formerly held by United Nations troops which have now departed from Korea or from replacement of these stocks, in strict accordance with the provisions of the armistice agreement.

In order to protect the security of the Republic of Korea against the possibility of a renewal of the Communist aggression, it will probably be necessary to continue to maintain Republic of Korea military forces at a high level. Meanwhile, of course, the great deterrent to any renewal of the Communist aggression is the experience of the Communists in connection with the 1950 Security Council resolutions on the Communist aggression, the subsequent response of members of the United Nations to the appeal for military assistance in the name of collective security, the decisive action of the General Assembly to meet the entrance of the Chinese Communists into the Korean hostilities, and the consequent joint policy declaration of the United Nations members who participated in the collective action.

#### **United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK)**

Among the matters concerning Korea which are to be considered by the General Assembly this session is the report of UNCURK. This body, which was established by the October 7, 1950, resolution of the General Assembly,<sup>7</sup> was designed primarily to supervise and assist in the political reunification of Korea, which at that time appeared imminent as a result of the collapse of the North Korean Army. In spite of the prolongation and stalemating of the fighting which re-

sulted from the subsequent intervention of Communist China—an action which was adjudged by the General Assembly to be a new aggression—UNCURK was promptly constituted and situated in the Republic of Korea. It was our hope that its presence and the fact that it was ready to assist the reunification of Korea would eventually prove of value, and that as the agent of the United Nations in Korea it could exert a useful influence in hastening the day when reunification might be possible. Unfortunately, Communist intransigence has prevented the fulfillment of this hope.

Nevertheless, UNCURK has continued to perform a useful function in its on-the-spot representation of the United Nations in Korea, and the United States believes it should continue, with its terms of reference unaltered. However, in light of present circumstances and the obviously limited range of what it may currently expect to accomplish in working toward our agreed goal of unification, the commission has decided for the time being to work through a subcommittee of four, all of whom are to be permanently located in Korea. The other three members, however, will continue to be available for meetings of the full commission at such times as it prepares its annual report, as well as upon the express call of the chairman of the commission. My delegation considers this arrangement eminently reasonable.

#### **Problem of Ex-Prisoners of the Korean War**

The delegation of India has submitted for our agenda two items relating to those ex-prisoners of the Korean conflict who did not desire repatriation. In their explanatory memorandum the Indian delegation indicated the desirability of the Assembly's considering the reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) and also requested the General Assembly to make definite arrangements for resettling and meeting the costs of the care and maintenance of the ex-prisoners who were taken to India, pending their final disposition.

The NNRC ceased to exist more than a year ago. Even at this late date, however, it is most fitting that we here should note with appreciation the work of the commission, and particularly the outstanding service of the custodial forces provided by India which had the difficult task of actually caring for the prisoners in their camps in Korea.

<sup>7</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 648.

In this connection, I would like to read President Eisenhower's letter of February 19, 1954, to Prime Minister Nehru:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Now that the mission of Indian troops is drawing to a close in Korea, I want to express to you my appreciation and that of my countrymen for the performance of the Indian Custodial Forces.

No military unit in recent years has undertaken a more delicate and demanding peacetime mission than that faced by the Indian forces in Korea. The vast majority of prisoners placed in their charge had from months of imprisonment and uncertainty become highly nervous and volatile. The confidence inspired by the exemplary tact, fairness and firmness shown by the Indian officers and men led by their two able commanders, Lieutenant General Thimayya and Major General Thorat, did much to alleviate the fears and doubts of these prisoners. The performance of these officers and their troops was fully in keeping with the high reputation of the Indian Army. They deserve the highest commendation.

With best wishes,  
Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

It is unfortunate that after all this time there still remain in India some 82 ex-prisoners who desire to avail themselves of those provisions of the Prisoner-of-War Agreement permitting them to go to neutral destinations of their choice, and whose resettlement thus far has not been achieved. We note that the Government of Brazil has generously offered to accept for permanent resettlement former prisoners who desire to go to Latin America. My delegation sincerely hopes that arrangements will promptly be made for a solution of this problem. I know all here share the hope that these ex-prisoners can soon be engaged in normal, constructive pursuits in their new homes.

#### Illegally Detained Military and Civilian Persons

Before concluding my remarks, I must also refer to a matter which my Government views with great concern and which has already been the subject of a United Nations General Assembly resolution last December.<sup>8</sup> I refer to the continued detention by the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities of captured and displaced personnel and the failure of these authorities to account for such personnel. This is a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Thanks to the expression of concern by this body and to the skillful and tireless efforts of the Secretary-General and others, the release of certain United States fliers, who were members of the United

Nations Command and who were detained illegally in Communist China, was recently obtained.<sup>9</sup> However, there still remain in Communist control tens of thousands of people who are entitled under the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement to be permitted and assisted to proceed to the territory under the control of the Republic of Korea.

Most of those who are still known to be living are Korean. Eye-witness reports still continue to arrive by means of escapees from Communist territory which indicate that many of these unfortunate people are being exploited in forced labor gangs in North Korea. Although the exact number of those still alive is unknown, it is known that there were about 24,000 Republic of Korea military personnel alive at one time in Communist custody for whom the Communists have never accounted. It is also known that there are at least 17,000 civilians, most of them people with special talents, including prominent Republic of Korea officials, who were captured when the Communists overran Seoul in 1950.

Additionally, there are a number of non-Korean civilians who are known to have been alive at one time in Communist custody and who have never been accounted for by the Communists. The nationalities reported include Irish, French, German, American, and others. There is also one stateless refugee, who there is reason to believe is still alive in North Korea and who desires to proceed to the Republic of Korea to join her family. The United States urges that the Communists take early steps to account for these unfortunate people and to release those still alive.

In conclusion, I would like to recall once more that the Korean problem is one with which the United Nations has been continuously concerned since 1947. It is a problem on which it has taken a consistent, honorable, and forthright position throughout. The United Nations has striven always for the establishment of a united, free, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. It has resisted vigorously and successfully—by means of the first collective-security military action in modern history—an attempt by the Communists to conquer the entire area.

I am confident that in our detailed discussions of the Korean item we shall live up to the fine

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1954, p. 932.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 953, and Aug. 15, 1955, p. 262.

traditions which this body has already established in dealing with Korea.

#### REFUTATION OF SOVIET CHARGES<sup>10</sup>

I listened with great attention yesterday to the statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union [Yakov A. Malik]. I had hoped to hear in this statement some indication of a change in the Communist attitude, or at least a hint that some change might be in the offing. But unfortunately we heard nothing of the kind.

The Soviet representative was quite vague yesterday in his suggestions with regard to a solution to the Korean problem. He said: "As before, the Soviet Union considers it essential to assure the unification of Korea through the carrying out of all-Korean, free elections on the basis of an agreement between North and South Korea, and in conditions that would rule out foreign intervention or any kind of pressure whatever on the voters." He said these elections "should be carried out not by foreigners but by the Koreans themselves under the supervision of an unbiased international organ."

While these suggestions are vague, there is nothing vague as to their meaning. For these are the same suggestions which the Communist side made at Geneva and has been repeating ever since. The possibilities of these suggestions were explored at length at Geneva, and the results of those efforts are well known. What the Soviet representative has now proposed, in effect, is that we should consider once more the same Communist proposals that we have considered, found sterile, and rejected in the past. These proposals, including the establishment of economic and cultural contacts between North and South Korea, were and are designed to prolong discussion, to mislead peoples into thinking there was agreement where in fact there was none, and, most importantly, to prevent the people of Korea from having a genuinely free choice as to their representation in, and the nature of, the government which is to administer a unified Korea.

These proposals have an objective as simple as it is devious. The objective is not a free, unified, and independent Korea under a democratic form

of government. The objective does not square with that of the United Nations. Instead, the Communist objective is to impose Communist domination on the whole of Korea. Recognizing that this cannot be done as long as the Republic of Korea and the United Nations remain alert, the Communists by these proposals hope to give the false impression of willingness to work toward the objectives of the United Nations while at the same time chipping away at those objectives by whatever means they can find.

The Communist rulers of North Korea have never dared face an honest election. Indeed, there has been to the knowledge of my Government only one election—and I repeat—one election for the so-called "Supreme Peoples Council." That was in 1948 and under Soviet supervision, where the customary single slate of candidates was presented for approval. The Communist proposals now suggest that representatives of this Supreme Peoples Council which rules a minority of the Korean people sit down together with the duly elected representatives of the three-quarters of the Korean people who live in the Republic of Korea. It is suggested that there be equality of decision between these groups! That jointly on this basis of parity they work out the laws and regulations to govern a future election throughout the country! Now, Mr. Chairman, the free world has had some experience with arrangements of this kind and with the governments that spring therefrom. We are all too familiar with the type of election the Communist representation would seek to impose on the Korean people. We remember the fate of some of the peoples of Eastern Europe.

We are told by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that we must recognize the realities of the situation. Is this reason for abandonment of a principle so fundamental as the freedom and independence of a long-suffering people? Certainly it cannot be said that the Soviet suggestion is worth trying just because it offers the only terms which the Communist side is willing to consider at this time! The United Nations has proclaimed just and proper objectives for a Korean settlement. Because they are just and proper, we must not be diverted from them.

The vast majority of the Korean people—those who fought so bravely and incurred such tremendous casualties against the Communist aggressors from the north—are adamant in their refusal to

<sup>10</sup> Statement made in Committee I on Nov. 15 (U.S. delegation press release 2274).

embrace such proposals. And they have a perfect right to take such a position. The Government of the Republic of Korea has agreed to stake its fate on free elections under United Nations supervision. Why, then, should anyone expect that Government and the people it represents to subject themselves to the delaying and misleading tactics of the Communist proposal? Why should anyone expect this Government to afford the totalitarian voice of communism a greatly disproportionate position—indeed a veto—in determining the future of the Korean people? On the contrary, I submit that it is the Communist regime in the north that should stand up and be counted, counted in a free election under United Nations supervision.

The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union ended his speech yesterday by telling us that in light of the facts—his facts—it becomes all the more obvious that it is necessary to convene a conference of the interested states on the Korean question. As I remarked earlier, there has been no change in the Communist position. They have given us no indication that they are now willing seriously to discuss the unification of Korea on a basis acceptable to the United Nations and to a majority of the people of Korea. I note that my distinguished colleague from Canada [Paul Martin] is also of the view that the time is not ripe for such discussions.

#### **Question of Troop Reductions**

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to address myself to several other points made by the Soviet representative. Yesterday he attempted to cast some doubt on certain figures and percentages which I cited in my statement of November 11. He said that I had occupied myself with "complicated calculations" concerning the reduction of foreign troops in North and South Korea.

Actually, the figures which I cited are quite simple and clear. They have been made available to every member of this committee, so that there is no mystery about them. These figures demonstrate that the United Nations Command has withdrawn from Korea a much larger proportion of non-Korean personnel than have the Chinese Communists. The reductions in the non-Korean strength of the forces under the United Nations Command were reported to, and checked by, the

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet representative, who found my figures "complicated," was unable to contest any of them.

The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union went on to say that the increase—it is a moderate increase—which has taken place in the size of the Republic of Korea Army prevents a "normalization" of the situation in Korea. I do not know what he means by "normalization"; but if he means that this increase is an understandable effort by the Republic of Korea to avoid a repetition of the nearly disastrous situation of June 1950, he is quite right. Certainly there is no need for me to belabor the fact that the Republic of Korea was the victim of the aggression, or the fact that its people constitute over three-fourths of the total population of Korea.

Moreover, as already made clear, the Communist side has substantially strengthened its matériel effectiveness by violating several provisions of the armistice agreement. The record of these violations has been set forth frequently by the representative of the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. And finally, in terms of military potential, there is, of course, a vast difference between Chinese Communist armies withdrawn from Korea but poised just across the Yalu River and United Nations personnel withdrawn to their home territories, most, some ten thousand miles from Korea.

Naturally, common prudence dictates some increase in the size of the army of the Republic of Korea. But, as I said in my first statement, and I wish now to repeat, "the equipment furnished to the Republic of Korea was provided from stocks formerly held by United Nations troops which have now departed from Korea or from replacement of these stocks, in strict accordance with the provisions of the armistice agreement."

#### **Fundamental Principles in Korean Settlement**

Mr. Chairman, let us turn again briefly to the fundamental problem with which we are concerned. I have spoken thus far of the position of the Government of the Republic of Korea and the attitude of the great majority of the Korean people who elected that Government. But we here have an equal responsibility to ourselves and to this organization to see to it that the aims and objectives of the United Nations are achieved. For



the position of the General Assembly, as expressed in its various resolutions on this subject, is a position based on fundamental principles. It is not based on procedural or tactical considerations. We would be doing a gross disservice to those who fought on the United Nations side in Korea were we to abandon these principles merely to demonstrate our willingness to engage in renewed negotiations and at a time when it is evident that such negotiations could not lead to any constructive result.

That is why the United States delegation has submitted the resolution which is before you in document A/C.1/L.145. We have sought in this resolution to give expression to the consensus of the views of the great majority of delegations represented here. This resolution recalls the principles which we regard as essential to a Korean settlement and reaffirms our intention to seek an early solution of the Korean question in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations. My delegation does not see how the United Nations could do otherwise.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I should like to suggest a minor modification in the last paragraph of the United States resolution, a modification which will make for greater clarity. We have asked in this paragraph that the Secretary-General place "this item" on the provisional agenda of the Eleventh Session. Since the main Korean item this year includes sub-items, and since there is a separate resolution dealing with one of these sub-items, I would suggest that in place of the words "this item" we should substitute the words "the Korean question." The paragraph would then read "Requests the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of its Eleventh Session."

Mr. Chairman, we believe that this resolution deserves the support of the overwhelming majority of this committee.

#### REFUTATION OF POLISH CHARGES <sup>11</sup>

It is with reluctance that I find it necessary to intervene again in this debate. I am aware that other urgent matters await the attention of the committee, and I am conscious of the desirability of dealing with those matters as soon as possible.

<sup>11</sup> Statement made in Committee I on Nov. 21 (U.S. delegation press release 2282).

However, the importance of the Korean question and the importance of the objectives of the United Nations with respect to Korea, as well as the nature of some remarks which have been made during the debate, make a further intervention on my part unavoidable.

The difficulties which lie in the way of achieving the objectives of the United Nations with respect to Korea are great enough; they should not be increased by statements before this committee which contain errors of fact and groundless accusations which do not assist the committee in a fair and dispassionate appraisal of the Korean situation.

After the series of protracted debates which have taken place on the Korean question, it is not necessary at this stage to deal with every charge, especially when we all know they were made for propaganda purposes. However, my Government cannot ignore the statement of last Wednesday by the representative of Poland [Juliusz Katz-Suchy]. Nor do we believe that this Assembly would wish that such a statement go unchallenged. For although the representative of Poland addressed himself primarily to the United States, he has really questioned the veracity of the United Nations Command and, thus, of the governments which have participated in that command or given it their support in other ways.

The purpose of my intervention today is to lay before this committee for the record some facts which will demonstrate the true character of the statement made by the representative of Poland. Let me give you but one example of the way in which he has introduced irrelevant information in a manner designed to leave mistaken impressions.

After attempting to paint a ridiculous picture of NNSC inspection trips made by helicopter, as if this were some cruel form of torture, he said: ". . . only a few days ago during one such inspection flight over South Korea three Polish members of the Supervisory Commission lost their lives in an accident." Now the representative of Poland knows—because these facts were checked by other Polish members of the Commission and reported to his Government—he knows that this flight in the first place was not an inspection trip. The accident occurred when Communist members of the inspection team stationed at Kunsan were being flown back to Panmunjom in an L-20 liaison plane—not a helicopter, by the way—as part of a normal rotation of personnel. He also knows,

but failed to mention, that the American pilot of the plane also lost his life. Mr. Chairman, this attempt to exploit an unfortunate accident and the loss of four lives to substantiate a baseless charge is typical of the techniques employed throughout his statement.

### Charges of Armistice Violations

Let me now turn to some of the more extreme charges concerning violations of the armistice agreement.

The delegate from Poland stated that the charges of Communist violations of the armistice agreement made by the United States and Australian delegates were not detailed or substantiated. He then said that the only detailed charge was that North Korea "organized a modern air force of about 400-500 jet aircraft." Now I wish to make clear that the charge we made was not that North Korea had no air force but that, up to the signing of the armistice agreement, whatever air force it did have was not based in North Korea. The Polish delegate correctly refers to communiques of the United Nations Command describing action by jet aircraft over North Korea and, I trust, will recall that these communiques also noted that the Communist planes fled back across the Yalu River to their bases in Manchuria.

At the time the armistice was signed, all airfields in North Korea were inoperative. They had been under continuous and effective attack by the air forces of the United Nations Command, and photographs taken by that command on July 27, 1953—the armistice became effective on the evening of that day—prove that on that day the Communist side had no combat aircraft operating from Korean air bases. Within a few months after the armistice was signed, however, United Nations Command radar surveillance detected continuously increasing jet aircraft activity from North Korean bases, thus establishing that the Communist side was in violation of paragraph 13 (d) of the armistice agreement. That provision of the agreement, you will recall, limits the introduction of combat aircraft, as well as other military matériel, to replacement "piece for piece" of the same effectiveness and the same type of equipment destroyed, damaged, wornout, or used up during the period—and I emphasize—during the period of the armistice.

Requesting your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, for

a few moments more on this aspect of the subject, I would like to call attention to the statement of the Polish delegate that this charge—he referred to the charge of illegal introduction of aircraft into North Korea—"was considered at a meeting the Supervisory Commission held on 22 February, and the commission did not take it into consideration." Now I am not certain just what he meant by the statement that the charge was *considered* by the commission and the commission did not take it *into consideration*. I believe, however, he may have reference to the request the senior member of the United Nations Command on the Military Armistice Commission made to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on February 21, 1955.<sup>12</sup> If so, what are the facts?

This request—the third such—was for the despatch of three mobile inspection teams to the air installations in the vicinities of six specific areas in North Korea. The command requested an investigation of the illegal introduction into North Korea of combat aircraft of MIG type as well as arms and ammunition therefor, between the period July 27, 1953, and February 5, 1955, and also an investigation of the failure of the Communist side to report such introductions of matériel to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Czech and Polish representatives successfully stalled this inspection for one week, during which time, as the United Nations Command radar surveillance established, the Communist side was able to fly most of its MIGs out of these areas. Finally three mobile inspection teams (#6, #7, and #8) were despatched to carry out this investigation.

### Report of Swiss and Swedish Representatives

The Swiss and Swedish representatives—representing, as you know, countries strictly neutral—found it impossible to reach a convincing judgment as to the justification of the charges made by the United Nations Command. But the Swiss and Swedish members of Team #7 concluded specifically, and I refer to Nnsc Document No. 132 of April 30, 1955, that "the team was not in a position to conduct the investigation in a sufficiently thorough manner which would have allowed [it] to reach a convincing judgment. . . ." This was so because, as the Swedish and Swiss members of this team reported:

<sup>12</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 428.

1. Except for three planes the inspectors were not permitted to approach MIG aircraft closer than 15 meters;

2. The Communist side refused the request of the Swiss and Swedish representatives to be shown the records of the aircraft movements. Proper records, of course, would have indicated when these planes were introduced into North Korea;

3. The Swiss and Swedish members had serious doubts about the alleged boundaries of the airfields, and their repeated requests to inspect even the nearest surroundings were denied. This, of course, made it impossible for them to ascertain whether additional aircraft were dispersed beyond the immediate confines of the airfield, which is the normal practice at military air bases.

The Swiss and Swedish members of Team # 6 and Team # 8 reported that they encountered similar difficulties, and accordingly they arrived at similar conclusions.

This, then, is also an indication of the way in which the Communist side has failed to cooperate with the Nnsc in North Korea. In that connection I would also refer to the statement of the representative of Poland when he said that "... in North Korea the control duties *can be* carried out to the extent provided by the agreement. ...". I note his careful use of the verb "*can be* carried out" and his candor in not using the verb "*has been* carried out."

As regards the cooperation of the two sides in assisting the proper functioning of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, let me quote briefly from a report to the Military Armistice Commission of May 7, 1954, by the Swiss and Swedish representatives of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

The United Nations Command side ... took from the beginning a broad view of its obligations and threw itself open to full control by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams stationed at the ports of entry in the territory under its military control. Partly on its own initiative and partly on request, it put at the disposal of the Inspection Teams all documents ... relating to incoming and outgoing matériel. ... The Inspection Teams were therefore in a position to inspect and to report on any matériel they felt to be interested in. ... No restrictions were imposed on the control activities of the Inspection Teams. ... full access was given to whatever documents they wanted to consult. The Inspection Teams took full advantage of these privileges. The Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side, on the other hand, ... never submitted any other documents for inspection than prior notification reports. ...

the Inspection Teams were unable to check efficiently on other movements and this because of the stand taken by their Czechoslovak and Polish members. ... in the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers the Czechoslovak and Polish Members of the Inspection Teams, thanks to their "veto" power, have kept those spot check controls to a bare minimum. ... they have merely become a face saving device devoid of any real significance. The Inspection Teams in the North have therefore never gained the insight in movements of matériel as have the Inspection Teams in the South.

On another occasion, Mr. Chairman, the Swiss and Swedish members rejected in its entirety a report of April 29, 1954, submitted by the Polish member of the Nnsc for the commission's consideration. This report charged the United Nations Command with violations of the reinforcing provisions of the armistice. In a memorandum of May 4, 1954, addressed to the Military Armistice Commission, the Swiss and Swedish representatives said:

There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the United Nations Command side has increased its combat strength in Korea since the Armistice agreement came into force. On the contrary, the Swedish and Swiss Members concluded ... for the months of October-November 1953, the United Nations Command side had considerably reduced its over-all combat strength during this period. The same trend has prevailed in the following months. ...

The charge that the United Nations Command side has violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement relating to the replacement of combat matériel piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and of the same type is merely a product of the imagination of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members.

The Swiss and Swedish representatives then went on to analyze the Polish report in which the Czech member subsequently had concurred, and concluded as follows:

These are some of the comments the Swedish and Swiss Members want to present in order to refute allegations which they consider to be a tissue of malicious fabrications, gratuitous distortions, misleading half-truths, and delusive insinuations without foundation in reality. The methods resorted to consist largely in isolating facts and figures from their proper context and in making sweeping generalizations on the basis of premises thus distorted. ...

... as far as the Swedish and Swiss Members have been able to find the United Nations Command has loyally and sincerely abided by both the letter and the spirit of the Armistice agreement.

#### U.N. Command Protests

Mr. Chairman, in statements made in the Military Armistice Commission on July 5 and 14, 1955,

Major General [Harlan C.] Parks, the United Nations Command Representative on that commission, summarized the manner in which the Communist side has violated the armistice agreement and, in collusion with the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC, has rendered ineffective all investigations of the illegal buildup of the Communist combat forces.<sup>13</sup> I shall not take the time to quote at length from General Parks' statements, which are a matter of public record. I shall present only a few statistics which will demonstrate the manner in which the two sides have observed, or not observed, the reporting provisions of the armistice agreement. General Parks, in the 60th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on July 5, 1955, pointed out that the Communist side, with a force of about 1,200,000 men at the time the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, made no personnel reports until September 12 of that year and no matériel reports until October 6, 1953. The combat matériel report on October 6 reflected an outgoing shipment of four—and I repeat four—57 mm antitank guns with only 20 rounds of ammunition. Not until February 9, 1954, was a combat matériel report made reflecting an incoming shipment—one 37 mm antiaircraft gun. It was apparently expected that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the United Nations Command would believe it possible logistically to support the huge Communist military forces in war-torn North Korea during the 6 months' period up to February 9, 1954, without a single incoming shipment!

During the first year of the armistice, the United Nations Command submitted 370 personnel reports; the Communist side only 42 such reports. The United Nations Command reports covered 287,343 arrivals and 362,122 departures. The Communist side reported only the ridiculous figures of 12,748 arrivals and 31,201 departures.

During this same period the United Nations Command submitted 1,057 combat matériel reports; the Communist side submitted only 24. The United Nations combat reports covered the movement of 9,717 combat aircraft, 1,034 armored vehicles, 194,385 weapons, and 386,828,087 rounds of ammunition. The Communist side, on the other hand, did not report the movement of even one combat aircraft during this 6 months' period and

reported only 14 armored vehicles, 1,848 weapons, and 746,500 rounds of ammunition.

The delegate from Poland has referred to certain recent difficulties which confront the personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the Republic of Korea. In view of the state of affairs that I have described and the continued evidence of Communist violations of the armistice, is it surprising that the people of the Republic of Korea have reacted strongly against the presence of the Communist members of the Supervisory Commission on their territory? For its part, the United Nations Command has scrupulously observed its obligation under the armistice agreement to afford the necessary protection to the personnel of the Supervisory Commission. That is why it has been necessary to take special precautions, such as helicopter transportation, for their safety. But, Mr. Chairman, I wish to make clear to this Assembly that, despite the precautions taken by the United Nations Command, there has been no interference with the carrying out of the responsibilities of the inspection teams stationed in the three ports of entry in the Republic of Korea.

The representative of Poland has also commented on the number of divisions and the amount of equipment withdrawn from Korea by the United Nations Command. He referred to information which he alleges was furnished to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission by the United States Military Command—I am sure he meant to say United Nations Command—to the effect that 15 divisions and equipment for 17 divisions had been withdrawn from Korea. He wonders, then, how it has been possible to equip the Republic of Korea Army from remaining stocks.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of the information he cites on withdrawals of matériel and divisions. But I remind the representative of Poland that the United States had only 8 divisions in Korea at the time of the armistice and has withdrawn 6 of them to the continental United States. Incidentally, the number of U.S. forces in areas adjacent to Korea has declined since the armistice agreement. As to combat matériel, the representative of Poland knows well that any such equipment withdrawn by either side, under the armistice terms, can be replaced on a piece-for-piece basis.

The representative of Poland also referred to

<sup>13</sup> For text of General Parks' July 5 statement, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 191.



the development of 10 new Republic of Korea reserve divisions. I had confined my earlier remarks to active forces on both sides. That these reserve divisions—and I emphasize their reserve nature—are in the process of organization is correct. I again wish to reiterate that the development of the Republic of Korea military forces is fully consistent with the armistice provisions. I have already made clear the necessity for these forces.

#### Meaning of "Free Elections"

Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, let us consider briefly the remarks of the representative of Poland with regard to free elections in Korea. There is one sentence in his statement with the language of which we fully agree, even though we differ as to its meaning. He said,

The difference between the two positions with regard to free elections lies in the fact that we favor really free elections in which the Korean people would decide on their future; we reject a mockery of free elections in which favorable results for one of the parties would be assured in advance.

It is certainly interesting to hear the representative of a Communist government express his opposition to "election in which favorable results for one of the parties would be assured in advance." This is news!

If the Communist side were in fact willing to subscribe to this language and, what is more important, to interpret it as it is understood by free peoples throughout the world, a just Korean settlement could quickly be achieved. Unfortunately, we know that his language is merely another example of upside-down Communist terminology. It is precisely because of their interpretation of the words "free election" that we must insist on a supervision of elections in Korea which would assure honesty in the sense in which the free world understands this term. That is why we must continue to reject the Communist proposal for supervision by a body in which there would be an equal number of Communist and non-Communist members. That is the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea which we have just discussed. What better reason is there for rejecting a similar body with such a built-in veto to supervise elections?

Mr. Chairman, in summary, this is what the record shows.

The United Nations Command has observed the armistice agreement; the Communist side has not.

The United Nations Command has cooperated fully with the NNSC and has tried to make the inspection system work; the Communist side has deliberately frustrated and obstructed the work of

#### Text of Resolution on Korean Question<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. A/C.1/722 dated November 22

*The General Assembly,*

*Having noted* the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea signed at Seoul, Korea, on 7 September 1955,

*Recalling* that in resolution 811 (IX), in approving the report of the fifteen nations participating in the Geneva Conference in behalf of the United Nations, the General Assembly expressed the hope it would soon prove possible to make progress towards the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and full restoration of international peace and security in the area,

*Noting* that paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 provides that the Agreement "shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides",

1. *Reaffirms* its intention to continue to seek an early solution of the Korean question in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations;

2. *Urges* that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objectives;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of its eleventh session.

<sup>1</sup> Sponsored by the U.S.; adopted by Committee I on Nov. 22 by a vote of 45-0-11 (Soviet bloc, Bolivia, Burma, Chile, India, Indonesia, Syria). The resolution was adopted in plenary on Nov. 29 by a vote of 44-0, with the same group of 11 countries abstaining.

the inspection system and caused it to fail in North Korea.

The nations represented on the United Nations Command proposed at Geneva a program which calls for, and would insure, free elections in Korea, and their report on that conference was approved in the last session of the General Assembly; the Communist side has proposed a plan which would give the North Korean regime, under which live

only a minority of the population of Korea, a veto over the more than three-quarters of the Korean people who live in the south.

The United Nations has long endeavored to find some solution for the Korean problem consonant with its objectives; the Communist side has refused even to recognize the legitimate interest of the United Nations in the problem on the grounds that the United Nations was a belligerent. This, Mr. Chairman, denies the very principle of collective security for which the United Nations stands so firmly.

All that I can say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, is to hope that before long the Communist side will find it possible to agree to satisfactory arrangements which will allow for genuinely free elections within Korea and thus enable the unification of that divided land under a free and independent government which will afford, at last, for the millions of people in North Korea, the freedom they desire.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Austria

State treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria. Signed at Vienna May 15, 1955. Entered into force July 27, 1955. TIAS 3298.  
*Adherence deposited:* Yugoslavia, November 28, 1955.

##### North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Signed at Paris June 22, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Notifications of being bound by terms of the agreement:*  
Denmark, November 30, 1955; Greece, December 2, 1955; Germany and Norway, December 6, 1955.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

#### BILATERAL

##### Chile

Agreement amending agreement for a cooperative program of technical assistance to medium and small industry of June 30, 1952 (TIAS 2750). Signed at Santiago October 28, 1955. Entered into force October 28, 1955.

##### Egypt

Agricultural commodities agreement pursuant to title I, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; P. L. 25 and 387, 84th Cong., (1955)). Signed at Washington December 14, 1955. Entered into force December 14, 1955.

##### Haiti

Agreement amending agreement establishing a Joint Council for Economic Aid of April 15, 16, 26, and 27, 1955 (TIAS 3430). Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince November 25 and 28, 1955. Entered into force November 28, 1955. TIAS 3431.

##### Israel

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended. Signed at Washington November 10, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955.

##### Libya

Agreement for a cooperative program in agriculture. Signed at Tripoli July 28, 1955. Entered into force July 28, 1955.

Agreement for a cooperative program in education. Signed at Tripoli July 28, 1955. Entered into force July 28, 1955.

Agreement for a cooperative program in natural resources. Signed at Tripoli July 28, 1955. Entered into force July 28, 1955.

Agreement for a program of public health. Signed at Tripoli July 28, 1955. Entered into force July 28, 1955.

##### Yugoslavia

Agreement providing for the purchase of additional wheat by Yugoslavia. Effected by exchange of letters at Belgrade October 1, 1955. Entered into force October 1, 1955.

## FOREIGN SERVICE

### Consular Offices

The Consulate at Hanoi, Viet-Nam, was closed as of December 11, 1955.

<b>China, Communist.</b> Continued Detention of U.S. Civilians by Communist China . . . . .	1049
<b>Congress</b>	
Cotton Textile Imports From Japan (Dulles, Smith) . . . . .	1064
Meeting With Congressional Leaders (Hagerty) . . . . .	1049
<b>Economic Affairs</b>	
Cotton Textile Imports From Japan (Dulles, Smith) . . . . .	1064
A Review of the World Economic Situation (Kalijarvi) . . . . .	1057
<b>Egypt.</b> Discussions Concerning Financing of Egyptian Dam Project . . . . .	1050
<b>Europe.</b> Education for Today's World (Murphy) . . . . .	1054
<b>Foreign Service</b>	
Consular Offices . . . . .	1086
Meeting of Public Committee on Personnel . . . . .	1053
Women in the Foreign Service (Heath) . . . . .	1051
<b>Health, Education, and Welfare.</b> Education for Today's World (Murphy) . . . . .	1054
<b>Japan.</b> Cotton Textile Imports From Japan (Dulles, Smith) . . . . .	1064
<b>Korea.</b> The Korean Question (Blaustein statements and text of General Assembly resolution) . . . . .	1074
<b>Mutual Security.</b> Discussions Concerning Financing of Egyptian Dam Project . . . . .	1050
<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization.</b> North Atlantic Council Holds Ministerial Session (text of communique and Dulles statement) . . . . .	1047
<b>Presidential Documents.</b> U.N. Human Rights Day, 1955 (proclamation) . . . . .	1048
<b>Protection of Nationals and Property.</b> Continued Detention of U.S. Civilians by Communist China . . . . .	1049
<b>State, Department of.</b> Meeting of Public Committee on Personnel . . . . .	1053
<b>Treaty Information.</b> Current Actions . . . . .	1086
<b>United Kingdom.</b> Discussions Concerning Financing of Egyptian Dam Project . . . . .	1050
<b>United Nations</b>	
Admission of New Members to the United Nations (Lodge statements, text of General Assembly resolution, and text of Security Council draft resolution) . . . . .	1067

The Korean Question (Blaustein statements and text of General Assembly resolution) . . . . .	1074
U.N. Human Rights Day, 1955 (Eisenhower) . . . . .	1048
<b>Viet-Nam.</b> Closing of Hanoi Consulate . . . . .	1086

## Name Index

Blaustein, Jacob . . . . .	1074
Dulles, Secretary . . . . .	1048, 1064
Eisenhower, President . . . . .	1048
Hagerty, James C . . . . .	1049
Heath, Donald R . . . . .	1051
Kalijarvi, Thorsten V . . . . .	1057
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr . . . . .	1067
Murphy, Robert . . . . .	1054
Smith, Margaret Chase . . . . .	1065
Willis, Frances . . . . .	1051

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 12-18

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to December 12 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 684 of December 8.

No.	Date	Subject
*688	12/12	Bishop sworn in as ambassador to Thailand.
*689	12/12	Wriston Committee meeting.
†690	12/12	Correspondence with U.S.S.R. on ecclesiastics.
†691	12/12	Berlin Conference Hall.
692	12/13	Wriston Committee report.
693	12/13	Dulles: departure for NAC meeting.
*694	12/14	Educational exchange.
†695	12/16	Renegotiations under GATT.
*696	12/16	Visas issued in fiscal 1955.
†697	12/16	Institute of Agricultural Sciences (rewrite).
*698	12/16	FSO's given rank of Minister.
699	12/16	Communist China's failure to release Americans.
700	12/17	Talks concerning Aswan Dam.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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